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How persistent are the effects of legal institutions adopted or inherited in the distant past? A substantial
literature argues that legal origins have persistent effects that explain clear differences in investor protections
and financial development around the world today (La Porta et al, 1998, 1999 and passim). This paper
examines the persistence of the effects of legal origins by examining new estimates of different indicators
of financial development in more than 20 countries in 1900 and 1913. The evidence presented does
not yield robust results that can sustain the hypothesis of persistence effects of legal origin, but it is
not powerful enough to reject it either. Then the paper examines if there were systematic differences
in the extent of investor protections across countries, since that is the main channel through which
legal origin affects financial development, and shows that all the evidence supports the idea of relative
convergence in corporate governance practices across legal families circa 1900. The paper concludes
that, if the evidence presented is representative, the variation observed in financial development around
the world today is likely a product of events of the twentieth century rather than a consequence of








Over the past few years, a series of papers published in top journals in economics and 
finance find institutions to be powerful predictors of economic and financial development that 
exert persistent effects over time (e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001, 2005; Banerjee 
and Iyer, 2005; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny—LLSV hereafter—1997, 1998, 
2000; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer—LLS hereafter—1999, 2008). The power of these 
findings derives from a strong correlation between exogenous institutions, or the variables used 
to instrument for these institutions, and current institutions that are highly correlated with 
economic and financial development today. These statistical findings are given economic 
significance by building a theory of how institutions adopted or inherited in the distant past 
have exerted persistent effects over time. But because few studies have explored whether 
correlations between institutions and economic and financial outcomes hold in the past, we 
cannot be certain the alleged persistence of the effects of these institutions passes the scrutiny of 
history. If these relations were not statistically significant in the past, the correlations observed 
today might instead be the product of recent events that have not been considered and 
incorporated into the statistical work of these institutional studies. 
This paper examines specifically the relationship between legal origins and financial 
development by analyzing the implied path-dependent relation between a country’s legal 
tradition and the extent of investor protections and financial development over time. A 
significant number of recent papers find legal origins to be strongly correlated with current 
indices of rule of law (Acemoglu, Jonhson, and Robinson, 2001; Beck, Demirguç-Kunt, and 
Levine, 2003b), financial development (LLSV, 1997, 1998; Djankov, McLeish, and Shleifer, 2007; 
Beck, Demirguç-Kunt, and Levine, 2003a, 2003b), the regulation of entry and labor (Djankov, La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2002; Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer, 2004), and the concentration of ownership (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 
1999) among other things. In particular, the work of LLSV (1997, 1998, 2000) and LLS (2000, 
2008) relates financial development to the extent of a country’s legal protections for investors 
(shareholders and creditors), arguing that ―when investor rights such as the voting rights of the 
shareholders and the reorganization and liquidation rights of the creditors are extensive and 
well enforced by regulators or courts, investors are willing to finance firms‖ (LLSV, 2000, p. 5). 
2Therefore, the theory goes, investors and banks are willing to finance firms as 
shareholders or creditors in exchange for the power to reduce agency costs by, for example, 
effectively monitoring management or devising contracts that align the incentives of managers 
and outside investors. The law and finance literature maintains that because shareholder and 
creditor protections provided at the company level are often embodied in financial contracts or 
company bylaws that, because of their exceeding complexity, impede enforcement by the 
courts, such provisions should instead be written into national company, bankruptcy, and 
securities laws, and, indeed, research has found financial markets to be more developed in 
countries that have legislated more shareholder and creditor protections (LLSV, 1997, 1998). 
 The world is divided by this literature into two main legal traditions, civil law and 
common law, and four legal families, Common law, French civil law, German civil law, and 
Scandinavian civil law. LLS (2008, p. 3) find that ―legal rules protecting investors vary 
systematically among legal traditions or origins, with the laws of common law countries 
(originating in English law) being more protective of outside investors than the laws of civil law 
(originating in Roman law) and particularly French civil law countries.‖ Legal origin is a valid 
exogenous variable for explaining investor protections and financial development because 
―countries typically adopted their legal systems involuntarily (through conquest or 
colonization)‖ and, hence, legal families can ―be treated as exogenous to a country’s structure of 
corporate ownership and finance‖ (LLSV, 1998, p. 1126). 
The current paper replicates in the most basic way the statistical exercises used to find 
correlations between legal origin and financial development today in order to test the implied 
persistence of the effects of legal origin using a variety of financial development indicators for 
1900 and 1913. This exercise follows the work of Bordo and Rousseau (2006) who use high 
powered money to GDP as their proxy for financial development and explore its relationship 
with legal origin in cross-sections in the past. Instead, the current paper uses a variety of 
conventional financial development indicators for 1900 and 1913 to test this same hypothesis, 
such as stock and market capitalization to GDP, private credit to GDP, and the not so standard 
deposits per capita. This exercise reveals significant differences in stock and bond market 
capitalization across legal families only in a few cases when we look at cross-sections of 
countries in the past. That is, the historical evidence does not provide robust support for the 
idea of a persistent effect of legal origin on financial development. Yet, since the sample size is 
3so small, we would expect the statistical tests (either t-statistics for a simple means test or t-tests 
for the coefficients of multivariate regressions) to yield no significant differences in financial 
development across legal families. For this reason, one could argue that the evidence is only 
weakly rejecting the persistent effects of legal origin according to some indicators of financial 
development, while accepting the hypothesis with others (especially deposits per capita).  
Thus, the last two sections of the paper look at whether there are systematic differences 
in investor protections in the past just like today. These sections of the paper consequently 
examine fragmentary evidence on investor protections, specifically, evidence of creditor and 
shareholder rights across countries at the turn of the twentieth century. That evidence reveals 
that, across common law and civil law countries circa 1910, creditor rights included in 
bankruptcy laws were quite similar and that the protection of shareholder did not rely strongly 
on government or court enforcement of shareholder rights (i.e., there was convergence on weak 
shareholder rights), most protections being either provided by companies or a product of 
regulation mandating strict disclosure rules for the prospectuses of new stock and bond issues. 
The fragmentary evidence of shareholder protections reveals no clear differentiation in 
terms of better or worse corporate governance across common and civil law countries. In many 
countries, companies reliant on outside financing had to win investor trust by either building 
good reputations or writing strong protections for small shareholders into their company 
bylaws. Among the latter were provisions that limited the power of large shareholders by 
restricting the number of votes per shareholder or reducing their voting power as their 
shareholdings increased. 
The idea of seeking significant correlations with legal origin in cross-sections of stock 
market capitalization in the past is not new. Rajan and Zingales estimated stock market 
capitalization in 1913 for 23 countries. But their findings that, on average, French and German 
civil law countries had larger stock markets than common law countries have been criticized for 
having too many outliers. Their critics argue, for example, that Rajan and Zingales 
underestimated stock market capitalization for some common law countries and overestimated 
it for French civil law countries (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 2008; Sylla, 2006). 
Evidence of the relationship between legal origin and financial development must thus be 
considered to be rather preliminary. 
4The current paper corrects Rajan and Zingales’ figures, and follows the work of LLSV 
(1998, 1999) and Djankov, McLeish, and Shleifer (2007) in examining by means of simple tests 
the differences in the impact of legal origin on financial development. The small sample size 
notwithstanding, the data presented here constitute an original attempt to expand Rajan and 
Zingales’ estimates with additional estimates of stock and bond market capitalization in 1900 
and 1913 as well as new figures that afford a look at the development of bank finance between 
1913 and 1929. 
Bordo and Rousseau (2006) use broad money to GDP in a sample of 17 countries to test 
the relationship between legal origin and financial development in the past, finding persistent 
effects of some of the legal variables only when the Netherlands is excluded from the regression 
(because it is a French civil law country with a large banking system). Yet these authors 
acknowledge that broad money to GDP is an imperfect measure of financial development 
because it mostly represents the development of the banking system and not of the stock or 
bond market. For this reason the current paper attempts to expand the evidence on the 
relationship between legal origins and financial development by using new indicators of 
financial development. 
Finally, according to the law and finance literature one of the main channels through 
which legal origin affects the development of financial markets is through investor protections. 
This does not imply that we should instrument for investor protections using legal origin 
because the latter variable affects financial development through channels other than investor 
protections (e.g., through regulation of labor, entry, and so forth). Still, we would also want to 
examine if there are systematic differences in investor protections in the past. This paper 
consequently assesses investor protections across countries in a separate section by compiling 
information on creditor and shareholder rights from unpublished sources and directly from 
some of the laws of the countries under study. 
The paper is divided into four sections. Section two briefly describes the data compiled 
for the present exercise. Section three, which explains the paper’s findings, is divided into three 
parts, the first using the results of the statistical work to examine observed differences in 
financial development around the world, the second documenting strong convergence in 
bankruptcy practices circa 1910, and the third finding no clear differences in corporate 
5governance practices across countries that belong to different legal families. Section four 
presents the conclusions. 
Data and Methodology 
Stock Market Capitalization and Companies Traded per Million People 
Rajan and Zingales’ (2003) study of the evolution of financial development across 
countries was the first attempt to explore the persistence of the effects of legal institutions. Their 
examination of the variation in financial market size in 23 countries, every decade, from 1913 to 
1999, revealed, irrespective of a country’s legal tradition, a first peak in financial market 
development circa 1913 followed after 1929 by a great and rapid reversal (less so in countries 
with a common law tradition) from which the financial markets in most countries did not 
recover until the end of the twentieth century. One of the most important findings of their 
study, included in the first two columns and the last one of Panel A of Table 1, is that in 1913 
both stock market capitalization over GDP and the number of traded companies per million 
people was higher, on average, in countries that adhered to the French civil law tradition than 
in common law countries.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE] 
 
The accuracy of Rajan and Zingales’ figures, however, has been questioned by, among 
others, Sylla (2006), who suggests that stock market capitalization in the United Kingdom circa 
1913 was perhaps overestimated by including bonds and stocks (a stock market capitalization to 
GDP ratio of 1.09), and stock market capitalization to GDP for the United States underestimated 
by including only the New York Stock Exchange and four other regional markets ―but not the 
New York Curb Exchange, other regional exchanges, or the extensive U.S. over-the-counter 
dealer market (that eventually became the NASDAQ)‖ (Sylla, 2003, p. 401). Sylla suggests that a 
more accurate picture of the size of the U.K. and U.S. stock markets can be obtained by using 
Raymond Goldsmith’s (1985) estimates, which show a stock market capitalization of 0.95 for the 
United States. 
Rajan and Zingales’ figures have also been criticized in a recent paper by La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008), who point out that (1) many of Rajan and Zingales’ 
6estimates of stock market capitalization include some corporate bonds, and (2) companies in 
many countries cross-listed in stock markets in Europe or the United States and, because what 
matters is the legal regime of the country in which a company is listed, companies cross-listed 
in London were perhaps borrowing that municipality’s legal system and, hence, not subject to 
the legal tradition of their home country. Observing that this leads Rajan and Zingales to 
overestimate stock market capitalization for French civil law countries such as Cuba and Egypt, 
LLS (2008) correct some of the figures that bias the averages for civil law countries up by, for 
instance, using new estimates for France and adjusting the figures for Cuba. For Egypt, they 
subtract the capitalization of bond issues and cross-listed companies (e.g., Havana Electric listed 
in Cuba, incorporated in New Jersey, and traded in New York). LLS (2008) also follow Sylla’s 
suggestion and correct the capitalization of the U.S. stock market (their figures are presented in 
Panel A of Table 1). After their corrections, common law countries have an average stock 
market capitalization almost twice that of the average capitalization for civil law countries.  
The present paper contributes to this debate by making two corrections to the data on 
stock market capitalization. First, the estimates of stock market capitalization in the United 
Kingdom are corrected using data from the Investors’ Monthly Manual. (Appendix A explains the 
methodology and assumptions used to estimate the stock market capitalization figures for the 
United Kingdom.) Second, using Goldsmith’s (1985) data, estimates published by Neymarck 
(1901, 1902, 1915), and a variety of primary sources described in Appendix B, Table 1 presents 
corrected estimates of stock market capitalization for 1913 (adding South Africa, Spain, and 
Uruguay, and correcting the figures for Brazil, Denmark, Egypt, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom) and a new set of estimates for 1900. The new estimates attempt to bias the market 
capitalization of French civil law countries downwards (by adding countries with relatively 
small markets and correcting some estimates downwards) and of common law countries 
upwards (by adding South Africa and correcting the capitalization figure for the United States). 
Nevertheless, the corrections for the U.K. market bring the average for common law countries 
down to a figure closer to that for civil law countries. 
Panel B of Table 1 assumes that each legal tradition is a country and estimates average 
stock market capitalization to GDP figures by adding the capitalization (in US dollars) of the 
stock exchanges of all the countries that follow a specific legal tradition over the sum of GDP 
7(also in dollars). When these averages are used, common law countries have a larger average 
stock market capitalization than their civil law counterparts in both 1900 and 1913.  
Another important finding is that, with such a small sample, changing the figures for 
one or two countries too readily alters the average by legal family. For example, whether 
persistence and common law ―domination‖ are supported can be affected by small errors in 
estimates of stock market capitalization for countries with larger markets. The paper thus tries 
to remain skeptical of the econometric findings, and relate them to other qualitative evidence 
available when making generalizations. 
Skeptics of the data on which the present paper relies might find the sample size to be 
inadequate to the performance of econometric tests, as it is difficult to believe that the sample is 
random and representative of the population of countries. Yet, the development of stock 
markets around the world was less broad than today. From a table presented in Appendix D, of 
the most important stock markets in the world circa 1913, it can be seen that the current sample 
covers more than half the total exchanges and all of the most important financial markets in the 
world. Indeed, it is unclear how the results would be changed by adding more observations. 
For common law countries, for instance, because most of the stock markets not included in the 
sample were rather small (e.g., Burma, Ceylon, Malaya, and Rhodesia), their inclusion would 
bias downwards the coefficients that measure the effect of this legal tradition. In other words, 
the current sample most likely overestimates average stock market capitalization for common 
law countries. In terms of French civil law countries, markets such as those of Indonesia, 
Rumania, and Venezuela might bias average stock market capitalization for the group 
downwards, but the bias introduced by excluding them would be partly compensated by the 
exclusion of Mexico and Portugal, both of which had markets of average or above average size 
(at the time, Mexico had a large mining exchange together with a regular stock exchange for 
banks and industrials, and Portugal significant banking and shipping sectors funded in the local 
exchanges). 
Bond Market Data 
Appendix C describes the sources of and assumptions used to estimate the bond market 
capitalization figures. Most of the new estimates follow Goldsmith (1985), who compiled figures 
for the stock of corporate bonds and stock market capitalization for 10 countries between the 
1870s and 1978 (the number of estimates varies over time). Goldsmith’s figures are 
8complemented by estimates of ministers of finance, directors of stock exchanges, and 
statisticians compiled by Neymarck (1902, 1915). For countries not included in the Goldsmith or 
Neymarck estimates, it was necessary to build new estimates using various official publications. 
Banking Data 
This paper uses two measures of banking development across countries. Albeit 
imperfect, they are the only indicators that have been compiled in a somewhat standardized 
manner. The first measure is private bank credit to GDP, which is usually combined with bond 
market capitalization to create an estimate of total private credit to GDP. The data on private 
bank credit are from a variety of sources, but rely heavily on the work of Goldsmith (1985), and 
include all private credit, discounts, and mortgage loans by banking institutions.1 It is difficult 
to compile these data for many countries, however, because they only became a relevant 
measure of financial development in the second half of the twentieth century. Thus, the sample 
is quite limited.2 
The second measure of banking development used for this exercise is deposits per 
capita. Whereas Rajan and Zingales (2003) compiled a measure of deposits to GDP for a sample 
of 20 countries in 1913, the statistics on deposits compiled by the League of Nations (1927, 1930) 
between 1925 and 1929 provide figures for total deposits for 1913 and 1925-1929 for between 30 
and 40 countries. 3 This paper uses data from the latter source, and normalizes deposits by 
population. With this larger sample the confidence in the results for the means test is higher. 
Yet, it is an imperfect measure of financial development for two reasons. First, it is not clear if 
more deposits per capita translate into higher supply of credit that can promote growth (we 
would need to have information about how banks used those deposits to know that). Second, 
these series of deposits represent the demand and time deposits of commercial and some 
savings banks, but exclude postal savings and other forms of savings that are more common in 
civil law countries. It thus has to be acknowledged that the data biases deposits per capita down 
                                                       
1 Other loan data is taken from Nakamura and Zarazaga(2003) for Argentina ; Eitrheim (2004) for 
Norway; Leacy (1983) for Canada; and Musacchio (2007) for Brazil. 
2 I have data on private bank credit to GDP for 16 countries, but there being no data on bond 
markets for India and Austria, I end up with 14 for the regressions. Another problem is that there is no 
GDP data for South Africa before 1906 or so, and nothing from Maddison before 1913. Thus, South Africa 
is also dropped from the regressions. 
3 All of the deposits data are from League of Nations (1927), Table 87, and League of Nations 
(1930), Table 104. 
9in civil law countries. Finally, for the regression analysis it does not make much difference to 
have deposits per capita for more countries because GDP estimates from Maddison (2003) are 
only available for 24 (in 1890) to 33 countries (in 1925 and 1929).  
Basic Regression Set Up 
The paper tries to mimic the estimates of simple OLS regressions of the correlates of 
financial development following the set up used by LLSV (1998) or Djankov, McLeish, and 
Shleifer (2007),4 but since there is no complete data on investor protections to include in the 
regressions, the specification used follows more closely the work of Bordo and Rousseau (2006). 
The OLS regression specification used is: 
qi=+ln(y/pop)i + gold + + (legal origin dummy) + ei 
where qi is a measure of financial development for country i (stock or bond market 
capitalization to GDP, private credit to GDP, number of traded companies per million people or 
deposits per capita), ln(y/pop)i is GDP per capita in either 1870 or 1890 (1990 PPP dollars from 
Maddison, 2003), gold  measures the number of years the country has been on the gold standard 
(measured in 1900 and 1913),   is the average inflation rate (arithmetic mean), and legal origin 
dummies are included. It is assumed that the errors, ei, are normally distributed. Both years on 
the gold standard and inflation are good measures of macroeconomic and political stability 
during this period of time (Bordo and Russeau, 2006; Bordo and Rockoff, 1996). All regressions 
are estimated with robust standard errors using White’s correction for heteroskedasticity. For 
robustness I also run regression specifications that mimic the origin LLSV set up and control for 
GDP growth, either since 1870 or since 1890 using the compound annual growth rate of GDP in 
1990 PPP dollars from Maddison (2003). 
Creditor and Shareholder Rights in National Laws 
The final part of the paper follows the methodology of LLSV (1998) and Djankov, 
McLeish, and Shleifer (2007) in compiling indices of creditor and shareholder rights from the 
bankruptcy and company laws of a small cross-section of countries for use in comparing 
countries over time. This work suggests that credit markets are likely to be larger in countries 
                                                       
4 Both LLSV (1998) and Djankov, McLeish, and Shleifer (2007) control for investor protections, but 
given that the information is not available for all countries, the current set up adjusts the exercise to check 
for simple correlations between legal origin and financial development indicators. 
10with bankruptcy laws that include any of the following rights: secured creditors have the right 
to repossess their collateral in case of default (i.e., no automatic stay on assets for debtors); 
priority dictates that secured creditors (i.e., collateralized creditors) are paid first; approval of 
creditors is necessary for reorganizing a firm or rescheduling the service of a firm’s debts; and 
original managers do not stay during reorganization (i.e., no debtor-in-possession 
reorganization; trustees elected by the court or creditors run a company declared by a court to 
be bankrupt).   
In the second part of the next section, indices of creditor rights are compiled for 
Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, Hong Kong, Spain, the Strait Settlements 
(Singapore), United Kingdom, and United States for 1910 (using the bankruptcy law in 
operation at that time). The main reason for including only French civil law and common law 
countries is that it is precisely in these two groups of countries where the literature finds more 
marked differences in creditor protections (LLSV, 1998; Djankov, McLeish, and Shleifer, 2007). 
The results of this compilation are included in Table 7. 
According to LLSV (1997, 1998), national company laws that contain more protections 
for minority shareholders have larger equity markets (e.g., larger equity markets to GDP, larger 
companies per million people, more IPOs per year, and so forth). In Table 10, I follow the 
methodology used by LLSV (1998) to identify the presence (or absence) of six shareholder rights 
they deem relevant for the growth of equity markets (relative to GDP) or for the increase in the 
number of companies that open their capital to the public in a handful of countries for which 
there is information easily accessible. First, I determine whether shareholders absent from 
shareholders’ meetings could vote (i.e., whether there was proxy voting). Second, I check 
whether shares were required to be deposited before a meeting and whether shareholders were 
prevented from selling their equity for several days after a meeting. Third, I look for cumulative 
voting or proportional representation whereby minority shareholders would elect board 
members. Fourth, I look for explicit minority-shareholder rights such as the right to challenge 
directors and assembly decisions in court and the option in the event of disagreement with a 
managerial or assembly decision to sell stock to the firm and thereby end one’s participation. 
Fifth, I check whether shareholders had the first right to buy new stock in order to preserve 
their share of the company in the event of a decision to expand total equity. Sixth, I coded as 
one when the percentage of capital needed to call an extraordinary meeting was less than or 
11equal to 10%. I added the number of rights present in the laws of each country to create what 
LLSV (1998) term the ―anti-director rights index‖ (bottom row of Table 10). Because voting 
rights and disclosure are also important determinants of financial development, but are studied 
separately by LLSV (1998), I mention differences in these investor protections in the text but do 
not compile systematic differences in disclosure and voting rights (mainly because there are no 
major differences across countries). 
Statistical Evidence on the Persistence of the Effects of Legal Origins 
(1900, 1913) 
Stock Market Capitalization across Countries in 1900 and 1913 
Today, when examining samples of 50 countries or more, students of financial 
development find significant differences in stock market development across countries that 
embrace different legal traditions (and families). The stylized view is that common law 
countries tend to have the largest stock markets, followed closely by German civil law 
countries, with Scandinavian and French civil law countries having the least developed 
markets. Panels A and B of Table 1 show the basic differences in average stock market 
capitalization across legal families in 1900 and 1913 according to Rajan and Zingales (2003), LLS 
(2008), and the new estimates introduced in this paper. According to all of the average measures 
except those of Rajan and Zingales, in 1900 and 1913 common law countries had relatively 
larger stock markets (to GDP) than most civil law countries. Using the average of the new 
estimates of stock market capitalization, and assuming that each legal family is a country (Panel 
B of Table 1), we find the average for common law countries to be 0.48 in 1900 and 0.65 in 1913 
and the equivalent figures for civil law countries to be 0.38 and 0.37 (French), 0.32 and 0.56 
(German), and 0.50 and 0.54 (Scandinavian). This preliminary evidence seems to support the 
idea that, just as today, on average, common law countries had larger stock markets than civil 
law countries. In fact, it can be seen in the graphical depiction in Panel A of Figure 1 that the 
distributions of stock market capitalization in 1900 and 1913 have relatively similar means and 
about the same level of dispersion across legal families. 
A better way to test for significant differences across legal traditions is to take into 
account the sample variance using t-tests for the difference of means. The results presented in 
Panel C of Table 1, which reports the t-statistics of the means test by legal tradition, do not 
12support the hypothesis of persistence of effects over time because there does not seem to be a 
significant difference in stock market capitalization across legal traditions in 1900 and 1913. The 
only significant t-statistic shows stock market capitalization to have been higher, on average, in 
German civil law countries than in all the other countries taken together. But the sample being 
so small, these tests must be taken only as weak evidence against the persistence of effects 
hypothesis. Even in LLS’ (2008) and Rajan and Zingales’ (2003) data, no clear differences can be 
discerned across legal families. LLS’ (2008) estimates show common law countries to have had, 
on average, larger stock markets in 1913, but the t-statistics for these differences are only 
significant at the 20% level. 
Finally, it can be seen in the data at the bottom of Panel C (Table 1) that countries that 
experienced higher than 1% average inflation since 1880 (difficult to achieve under the gold 
standard) also had significantly lower stock market capitalizations (most of these were at the 
time ―emerging‖ markets such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and India). This variable is, in fact, a 
proxy for macroeconomic instability and weak adherence to the gold standard, and thus 
suggests the importance of taking into account contingent factors when trying to explain 
variation in financial development. 
In sum, the results as they stand suggest convergence rather than divergence in financial 
development across legal families. This finding is confirmed by an examination of the 
correlation between legal origin and stock market development in a multivariate setting. 
Following LLSV (1997), I estimate specifications that control for the demand for finance using 
the logarithm of GDP per capita in 1870 or 1890 and the growth rate between 1870/1890 and 
1900/1913, and include dummies for legal origin to test for significant differences across legal 
traditions. The summary statistics are reported in Table 2; the regression output is presented in 
Tables 3 and 4.  
 
[TABLE 2 AROUND HERE] 
 
Table 3 looks at the conditional correlation of the common law dummy with different 
measures of financial development in 1900 and 1913. Specifications 1 to 8 in Panel A of this table 
uses the data compiled by Rajan and Zingales (2003) and LLS (2008) to examine the conditional 
correlations of legal origin and financial development. In none of the specifications do we find 
13significant coefficients for the common law dummy and in fact, with the the data of Rajan and 
Zingales (specifications 1 to 4) the coefficients that capture the difference in stock market size 
between common and civil law countries (common law coefficient) have mostly the wrong sign 
(they are negative instead of the expected positive). In specifications 5 to 8, with the data of LLS 
(2008), the coefficients have the right sign but are not significant in any of the specifications. 
Across specifications 1 to 8, it can also be seen that the F-statistics that test the joint significance 
of all the coefficients are not significant except for two specifications. 
 
[TABLE 3 AROUND HERE] 
 
Specifications 9 to 16 perform the same exercise using the new estimates of stock market 
capitalization in 1900 (specs 13 to 16) and 1913 (specs 9 to 12). Using the new data, all of the 
specifications are seen to be more powerful in explaining the variation in the new estimates of 
stock market capitalization, yielding more robust coefficients and higher F-statistics. The 
coefficients for legal origin, however, are not significant in any of these specifications and have 
wrong sign (negative instead of positive). In sum, the evidence presented in Panel A of Table 3 
does not offer robust support for the idea of persistence of effects of legal origin. Tables 4A and 
4B also use the different measures of stock market capitalization and run specifications that 
control for GDP growth and other combinations of legal origin dummies. The results are 
basically the same. 
It can also be seen in specifications 11, 12, 15, and 16 of Table 3 that that the coefficients 
for the variables that measure the number of years on the gold standard and average annual 
inflation since 1880 is large and highly significant. Average inflation between 1880 and 1913 is a 
proxy for macroeconomic and/or political instability. The fact that this variable is highly 
significant suggests that perhaps other contingent factors need to be taken into account to 
understand the variance in financial development across countries. The number of years on the 
gold standard is also a measure of macroeconomic stability and we would expect it to have 
provided investors with more security when buying securities with nominal (non-indexed) 
values and payment schedules. In fact, these results is consistent with the finding of Djankov, 
McLeish, and Shleifer (2007) and Bordo and Rousseau (2006) that countries with higher average 
inflation have smaller (private) credit markets. That the coefficient for average inflation does not 
14work in the same way in specification 16 of Panel A might be related to measurement error in 
the inflation figures before 1900 inasmuch as for most countries data on inflation is only 
accurately measured and widely available after 1900. 
In sum, these results suggest that other factors such as demand for financing (e.g., how 
developed a country is) and stability of the macroeconomic and political environments are more 
highly correlated than legal origin with stock market development. Legal origin dummies are 
not significant in any of the specifications used. Still, given the sample size, these results cannot 
be taken at face value. Both the sample size and the low degrees of freedom would lead us to 
expect insignificant coefficients (because low degrees of freedom increase the size of standard 
errors and, thus, reduce the size of the t-statistics). This is why fragmentary evidence presented 
at the end of the paper of relative similarity of corporate governance practices across countries 
is used to make the case that perhaps there was convergence in financial development. 
Bond Markets around the World in 1900 and 1913 
The same exercise detailed in the previous section can be performed with the new 
estimates of bond market capitalization to GDP. Panel A of Table 1 shows the new estimates of 
bond market capitalization to GDP for 16 countries in 1900 and 18 countries in 1913. The means 
by legal family in Panel A and estimated means in Panel B (which treats each legal family as a 
country) show common law countries to have had significantly larger bond markets than civil 
law countries. In particular, Scandinavian countries seem, on average, to have had the smallest 
bond markets. Another way to understand why common law countries, on average, have larger 
bond markets is to look at Panel B of Figure 1, which shows that bond markets in the majority of 
common law countries were relatively small compared to those in French civil law countries, 
but because the United Kingdom had the largest bond market in the world, the average for 
common law countries is strongly biased upwards.  
These differences across legal families are partly a product of how the estimates for these 
countries were constructed, biased upward for common law countries (see Appendix A for the 
methodology used for the United Kingdom) and downward for civil law countries (see 
Appendix C). For instance, France had one of the largest bond markets in the world, by some 
estimates even higher than 100% of GDP, but because many of the bond issues were either 
cross-listings or government-guaranteed bonds the figures had to be adjusted to reflect the 
market for private securities rather than the market for securities with sovereign backing. This 
15problem also applies, however, to common law countries, which traditionally also guaranteed 
bond coupons and stock dividends in transportation companies. But the figures for common 
law countries do not correct for that, thus the bond market data has a bias upwards in some 
common law countries.5 
Even after biasing the estimates for common law countries up, the differences in bond 
market capitalization are not significant, either in the simple means test (Panel C of Table 1) or 
in the multivariate setting. For instance, in Panel B of Table 3 I repeat the multivariate exercise 
using bond market capitalization to GDP as a dependent variable. The results do not support 
the hypothesis of persistence of effects of legal tradition, but the dummies that measure the 
differences between common and civil law countries have the right sign in all of the regressions, 
and are almost significant at the 10% level. As a robustness check, Table 5 runs specifications of 
the same regression that control for GDP growth and use different combinations of legal origin 
dummies. When controlling for GDP growth (done as a robustness check) the coefficient for 
common law is large and significant at the 10% level, suggesting that common law countries 
had a bond market capitalization of 0.28 of GDP, higher than that of Scandinavian and German 
civil law countries, and at least 0.18 larger than that of French civil law countries. Most of the 
specifications, however, do not pass the joint significance test. 
The evidence for bond markets is thus also not powerful enough to suggest that legal 
origins have persistent effects on financial development. Inflation seems to be more highly 
correlated with bond market development. Even if the coefficients have the right sign and are 
sometimes significant, the results are weak statistically and might be driven by the one outlier, 
the United Kingdom (controlling for the UK does not help because the coefficients for common 
law did not become significant). The most important correlate of bond market capitalization 
seems to be average inflation. An average inflation rate of 1% is related to smaller bond market 
capitalization to GDP by around 0.06 in 1900 and 0.04 in 1913. This is a significant drop given 
that the means for bond market capitalization in those two years were 0.18 and 0.17 
respectively.  
                                                       
5 For a discussion of how problematic it is to disentangle government-backed securities from 
private securities, especially in the railway sector, see Hautcoeur (1994). Government guarantees in 
common law countries have scarcely been studied. For a good idea of how these guarantees worked, see 
Carlos and Lewis (1995). 
16One could argue that these exercises are not equivalent to those performed by the law 
and finance literature nowadays. Most of the papers in this literature use estimates of private 
credit over GDP rather than bond markets as the dependent variable. Private credit to GDP is a 
better measure of credit market development, but it is not clear that it should be related to 
differences in legal traditions because bank and other forms of private credit do not need formal 
contract enforcement mechanisms in order to grow, personal connections and other forms of 
cooperation between banks and companies usually being relied upon to facilitate the 
enforcement of such contracts (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Maurer and Sharma, 2001). 
Notwithstanding this caveat, specifications 9 to 12 of Panel B (Table 3), use as a 
dependent variable the scant evidence available on private credit to GDP from Table 1 and 
displays the same regression specifications used above. In specifications 9 through 12 of Panel B 
(Table 3), the common law country dummy is only significant after controlling for inflation or 
years on the gold standard, but has the wrong sign. In fact, in all specifications, this dummy has 
a negative coefficient, and even if not significant, the results do not go in the expected direction. 
Moreover, in specifications 13 through 16 (Panel B of Table 3), which use the number of traded 
companies as a dependent variable in an additional robustness check, no significant difference 
was observed between common law and civil law countries, and the coefficients were negative. 
As an additional robustness check, Table 6 runs similar specifications controlling for GDP 
growth and using other combinations of legal origin dummies. But the results are basically the 
same. 
In sum, even if, on average, common law countries had larger bond markets than civil 
law countries, these differences are not statistically significant and seem to be driven by the 
inclusion of the United Kingdom’s extremely large bond market. When using the scant evidence 
on private credit to GDP, the results also go against the persistence of effects hypothesis. 
Finally, using as an extra check the number of companies traded per million people also reveals 
no significant difference in financial development across legal families. 
Deposits per Capita around the World, 1913-1929 
Table 7 presents the summary statistics and means test for the data on bank deposits per 
capita in 1913, 1925, and 1929. These data provide more robust evidence favoring the 
persistence of effects hypothesis, deposits per capita in common law countries being 
significantly larger than in French civil law countries in 1913. Yet there are no significant 
17differences in deposits per capita among common law and German and Scandinavian civil law 
countries in that year. Thus, this indicator of financial development provides only weak support 
for the dominance of common law over civil law countries before 1913. 
 
[TABLE 7 AROUND HERE] 
 
By 1925, common law countries have larger deposits per capita than German civil law 
countries, an interesting result because, according to Perotti and von Thadden (2006), financial 
development should be most affected in those countries that suffered the largest inflationary 
shock after World War I. This evidence supports their view because the high inflation (in some 
cases, hyperinflation) in many of the German civil law countries during the 1920s must have 
affected the rate of deposits per capita by 1925. In fact, the average deposits per capita were 
larger in 1913 than in 1925.  
Scandinavian civil law countries also seem to be losing ground vis–à-vis common law 
countries over the 1920s. In fact, by 1929 average deposits per capita are significantly larger in 
common law than in Scandinanvian civil law countries (with a t-statistic significant at the 18% 
level). 
Panel A of Table 8 displays the results of the multivariate analysis using deposits per 
capita as the dependent variable. In this case the results confirm the persistent effects 
hypothesis and are robust to the inclusion of most controls. In fact, with this data we find that 
the coefficient for the common law dummy is significant at the 1% level. Common law countries 
have $50 dollars more in deposits per capita than the average country in 1913, over $100 in 1925 
and $120 in 1929. Moreover, deposits per capita in French civil law countries are falling relative 
to the average over time. 
 
[TABLE 8 AROUND HERE] 
 
Panel B of Table 8 repeats the exercise but looking only at the change in deposits per 
capita from 1913 to 1929 and controlling only for GDP growth and average inflation between 
1913 and 1929. In common law countries the growth in deposits is also higher than the average 
country and French and Scandinanvian civil law countries have lower deposits per capita than 
18the average. The dummy for German civil law countries is not significant because even if they 
lost ground versus all the countries after the inflation of the early 1920s (with extremely high 
inflation in Poland, Hungary, Germany, Austria), they recovered their level of deposits per 
capita by 1929, in contrast French civil law countries did not experiment such high levels of 
inflation, but did not have a significant increase in deposits. 
Based on these results one could say that because there are systematic differences in 
deposits per capita and because some of the coefficients for the common law dummy in Table 3 
(where the dependent variable is bond market capitalization to GDP) are also positive and 
significant at the 10% level, there is enough evidence to sustain the hypothesis of persistent 
effects with common law having larger financial markets. Given that the sample size is small 
and the degrees of freedom to estimate the standard errors is low, all of the statistical tests 
performed so far (including the means tests) would obviously lead us to accept the null 
hypothesis that there are no significant differences among legal traditions (or that the coefficient 
for the legal origin dummy is not different from zero). Thus, finding that some of the 
coefficients are significant should be strong enough to show that legal institutions have 
persistent effects. Yet, the evidence in some of the other regressions shows not only insignificant 
coefficients for the common law dummy, but also coefficients with the wrong sign. Thus, it is 
hard to say the evidence is strongly pushing for one side or the other. This is why the discussion 
of the next couple of sections might also shed some light on how much there was divergence or 
not in the institutions that supposedly sustain financial development. 
Could it be taxes? 
Another explanation, which has been so far disregarded completely by the literature, is 
that different taxation levels across countries drove some of the differences in the size of equity 
and bond markets. For instance, in some countries, governments charged stamp taxes for the 
listing of equity or corporate bonds (usually exempting government bonds). Moreover, there 
were other taxes that may have affected the listing of securities, like taxes on the turnover of 
securities, on interest and dividend gains, and the taxes that stock brokers had to pay per 
transaction.  
In Europe there was significant variation in the levels of taxation of stock transactions at 
the turn of the twentieth century. In Table 11 I show some of the taxes charged for listing 
securities, for the turnover of those securities, for the interest and dividend gains on stocks and 
19bonds, and other taxes on the transactions conducted by stock brokers for a selection of 
European countries for which the data is easily accessible for 1905. Some states taxed heavily 
stock exchange transactions, while others took a more laissez faire approach. For instance, Spain, 
Sweden, and Germany taxed more heavily the listing of securities, with an estimated stamp tax 
that was equivalent of two to three percent of the face value of the security, while other 
countries like Denmark, the United Kingdom, and Austria charged less than 1%. At the extreme 
was Norway that did not tax the listing of securities at all. The same can be said for other taxes. 
For example, the taxation of interest and dividend gains shows extreme variation. Countries 
like Spain, Hungary, and Italy taxed interest and dividend gains from corporate securities more 
heavily (over 10%), while Sweden, Denmark, and Belgium had taxes around 1% (Belgium 
apparently had not taxes on dividend/interest gains). 
Now, can the variation in these taxes explain some of the variation in stock and bond 
market size? The question is relevant, unfortunately the number of countries for which 
information on financial development and taxation is available is rather limited. Therefore, in 
Table 12 I pursue this exercise with 10 observations for which I have complete data. Not 
surprisingly, taxes do not seem to drive the variation in stock and bond market size. Yet taxes 
on both stock listings and dividends seem to explain significantly some of the variation in stock 
market size. Yet, when I include other controls like GDP per capita in 1890 the tax variable loses 
significance (most likely because of the sample size). It is still interesting to see that the 
coefficients in specifications 7 and 10 have negative signs and similar magnitudes 
(approximately an increase in taxes of 1% reduces stock market cap by almost 17 percentage 
points of GDP, say from 100 percent of GDP to 83 percent of GDP). Further data will render this 
test more robust, though. 
Creditor Rights c. 1910 
An alternative way of looking at the persistent effect of legal institutions is to examine if 
we find systematic differences in investor protections in the past, just like we do today. Today 
there are clear differences in the way countries and their governments protect creditors in their 
bankruptcy laws. According to LLSV (1998), countries with bankruptcy laws that afford 
stronger protections for creditors, in particular, bondholders, tend to have more developed 
credit and bond markets. In their survey of bankruptcy laws in 1995 they find that common law 
20countries afford creditors the significantly more protection than civil law countries, with French 
civil law countries offering the weakest protections. Moreover, Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer’s 
(2007) study of creditor protections in the bankruptcy law of six cross-sections of countries 
between 1978 and 2003 finds differences in the level of creditor protections between French and 
common law countries to persist over time. 
This marked difference in terms of creditor rights protections and credit market 
development between common and French civil law countries today would be expected to have 
persisted over time. If the statistical work presented in the previous section did not uncover 
clear differences in credit market development, perhaps looking at bankruptcy laws in common 
and French civil law countries will. 
But in contrast to what researchers find with recent data, circa 1910 the norm across 
countries was convergence on relatively strong creditor protections. Differences in creditor 
rights in the bankruptcy laws of the largest countries in Europe and the Americas were 
minimal. In Table 9, which compares creditor rights for a cross-section of six common law 
countries and five French civil law countries circa 1910, it can be seen that, on average, both 
French civil law and common law countries had three of the four protections LLSV (1998) and 
Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) find explain significant differences in credit market 
development today. This table also reveals significant differences in creditor rights in these 
same countries in the past and today. Even if fragmentary, this evidence against the persistence 
of effects hypothesis provides a plausible explanation for the weak coefficients for the legal 
origin dummies when used to explain creditor market development in the past. The evolution 
of creditor rights from 1910 to 1995 can thus be inferred from an examination of the table. The 
findings regarding variation in creditor rights at the cross-sectional level are (1) that French civil 
law countries (and some common law countries such as Australia and Canada) started with 
pro-creditor laws and ended up, on average, with pro-debtor laws, and (2) that common law 
countries (primarily former British colonies) in some instances had weaker creditor protections 
in the past. 
 
[TABLE 9 AROUND HERE] 
 
21The leniency of bankruptcy laws in some common law countries and colonies reflects 
the greater power accorded the judiciary to approve corporate reorganizations and decide 
whether creditors can take possession of assets. For example, according to a contemporary 
bankruptcy expert, the United States Bankruptcy Law of 1898 was quite different from those of 
Continental Europe (and England) because ―no one can be made bankrupt against his will, and 
mere non-payment of debt does not form an act of bankruptcy entitling the creditors to take the 
estate into their own hands‖ (Brown, 1900, p. 268). 
In contrast, most French civil law countries circa 1910 strictly enforced repossessions and 
granted creditors more power to run receiverships and take companies to the liquidation stage. 
Table 9 tries to bias the figures for French civil law countries towards being debtor-friendly by 
coding them as permitting management to stay during reorganization, although this was not 
strictly the case. In French civil law countries, reorganizations run by incumbent management 
had to be approved by creditors, and there was no debtor-in-possession reorganization under 
the protection of the court that could be applied across the board as in Hong Kong and the 
United States. In French civil law countries (as well as in Germany), if creditors did not approve 
compositions, companies went into liquidation under the management of selected trustees, 
mostly from the largest creditors (Brown, 1900). 
The evidence presented in this chapter and the historical evidence presented in other 
recent works suggest that the decline of creditor rights in civil law countries and emergence of 
strong creditor rights in common law countries occurred mostly during the twentieth century. 
For example, using more comprehensive indices of debtor punishment, Sgard (2006) found the 
bankruptcy laws of common law countries to be more lenient than those of civil law countries 
throughout the nineteenth century. Civil law countries’ harsh punishments for debtors were 
eliminated only in the second half of the nineteenth century. Additionally, most countries in 
Europe adopted procedures that facilitated reorganization (e.g., the concordat préventif, a form of 
debtor-in-possession reorganization) and continuation of the going concern (always with 
creditor approval). The reason for this convergence on a more lenient bankruptcy system is not 
clear, but probably has to do with the fact that before World War I there was close 
communication among lawyers and policy makers across countries. According to Sgard, 
businessmen across the continent pressured lawyers and lawmakers for a more uniform set of 
laws. 
22In sum, the evidence on creditor rights points in the direction of convergence rather than 
divergence across countries that belong to different legal families. In the next section, the less 
standardized evidence on shareholder protections across countries is examined. 
Shareholder Protections in Company Laws and Corporate Governance 
Practices before WWI  
If neither the financial data nor the survey of creditor rights in the previous section 
support the persistence of effects hypothesis, it might be the case that there are persistent 
differences in shareholder rights across countries that have not been captured because the data 
on stock market development are rather limited. In this section, fragmentary evidence compiled 
on the extent of shareholder protections across countries circa 1900 and 1913 is examined. Yet, 
the analysis reveals no clear differences in the way shareholders were protected across countries 
that belong to different legal families.  
Most studies of investor protections in national company laws conclude that the initial 
boom in stock market development in the early part of the century occurred despite a lack of 
protection for small shareholders. Table 10 examines the extent of shareholder rights included 
in national laws for five countries for which detailed data are available. Most countries that 
have been subjects of documented studies had no more than two of the shareholder protections 
LLSV (1997, 1998) consider necessary for the development of a large stock market with a high 
proportion of widely held corporations.  
 
[TABLE 10 AROUND HERE] 
 
Even if investor protections were weak in most countries’ national laws, we know from 
Rajan and Zingales (2003) that stock market activity first peaked in the twentieth century in 
1913. Thus, if investors participate in financial markets to a large extent when they know their 
returns are safe from the abuses or expropriation by insiders and directors, there had to be a 
system of shareholder protections in place that encouraged investors to buy equity during this 
period. Perhaps what mattered for the development of equity markets was not the protections 
for minority shareholders in national company laws, but the conditions that facilitate the the 
private enforcement of protections. For instance, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006) 
find that stock markets tend to be larger in countries in which the governments require more 
23detailed disclosure of information about company promoters and directors at the time of an 
initial public offering, or simplify the burden of proof necessary for smaller shareholders to sue 
directors for fraudulent behavior.  
Indeed, at the turn of the twentieth century, legislators took seriously the need for 
disclosure of financial information about companies and the identities and intentions of 
promoters of new share or bond issues. English law was the strictest in this respect, companies 
being required to publish their statutes, shareholder list, shares each director had on deposit,6 a 
list of securities issued in the last two years, names of the underwriters and fees paid them, and 
detailed explanations of the fees paid to promoters, among other things, every time they 
wanted to issue shares. A copy of the prospectus, dated and signed, had to be deposited at the 
local registry before the securities could be issued.7  
It is unclear whether requirements for disclosing information about companies and 
company promoters were influenced by legal tradition. The United States had no disclosure 
requirement for corporations across the board. In fact, financial disclosure was not mandatory 
at the New York Stock Exchange until 1895 (Hannah, 2007b, pp. 15–17) and there were no 
mandatory disclosure requirements for prospectuses in other exchanges or for general issues of 
shares or bonds. Requirements for disclosure were not as strict in French civil law countries as 
in England, but new issues of shares or bonds required the publication of balance sheets, 
complete shareholder lists, names of the directors, and other information that varied by 
country. For instance, in France after 1907 the law mandated the publication of balance sheets, 
shareholder lists, and a complete list of the company’s debts and bonds in the Journal Officiel 
(Wellhoff, 1917, p.27). In other places (such as Brazil since 1891) the law mandated that ―the 
prospectus for a new share issue should have names of the company founders, a detailed 
explanation of the contracts with the bankers or financiers involved in the operation, and the 
amounts that company was paying to these intermediaries in the form of commissions or fees. 
More importantly, the prospectus had to be accompanied by a copy of the company statutes 
after their publication in a newspaper of wide circulation‖ (Musacchio, 2007, pp. 13–14). Italy 
                                                       
6 It was common circa 1900 to ask directors to own shares and deposit them at the company 
during their tenure. This served to align the directors’ incentives and constituted a sort of ―guarantee 
deposit‖ in the event a director committed fraud. For examples of how these deposits operated in 
England, see Hannah (2007b). 
7 A detailed description of the disclosure requirements for new issues in England can be found in 
Wellhoff (1917, pp. 20–24). 
24required as well the disclosure of the fees paid to founders. In contrast, countries such as Egypt 
had no provisions regulating the publication of a prospectus (Wellhoff, 1917, p. 20). 
In German civil law countries, the evidence is mixed, too. In Germany, the law of 1896, 
which regulated the operation of the stock exchanges, required that to have its shares admitted 
to quotation a company had to publish a prospectus that included all of the provisions required 
by English law (Wellhoff, 1917, p. 25). The Chinese legislation followed the German model and 
demanded detailed information about the promoters of a company and the company itself. For 
instance, it literally required details on ―whether or not the organizers obtain any extra profits 
or have been promised such advantage by others‖ as well as about the ―sort of financial 
agreement with others have been entered into beforehand by the Organizers in order to 
establish the Company‖ and provided clear bright-line rules about the fees and penalties for 
company promoters who committed any fraud against investors (Williams, 1905). But in other 
German civil law countries, the requirements for prospectuses were less strict. Franks, Mayer, 
and Miyajima (2007) found in Japan there were no requirements to publish a prospectus.  In 
sum, there was no clear lead in terms of disclosure requirements at the time of new share or 
bond issues, and significant variation in level and requirements by country. 
Disclosure of information was not the only way shareholders were protected from the 
abuses of managers or corporate insiders at the turn of the twentieth century. Many large 
corporations gained investors’ trust by including in their charters bylaws that limited the power 
of large shareholders, for instance, by limiting the maximum number of votes per shareholder 
or by using graduated voting scales that gave shareholders fewer votes as their shareholdings 
increased. It is unclear whether legal tradition influenced the level of protection shareholders 
enjoyed because significant variation within legal families makes it difficult to sustain the 
persistence of effects hypothesis and the evidence, even if fragmentary, shows less differences 
across countries than one would expect from looking at the variation in these protections today. 
In England, for example, companies commonly included maximum vote provisions or 
graduated voting scales. According to Campbell and Turner (2007), in 1883, 43% of the 716 
companies listed on the London Stock Exchange for which they have data incorporated 
graduated voting scales and 23% maximum vote provisions in their bylaws. In the aggregate, 
52% of corporations had caps on voting, graduated voting schemes, or a combination thereof. 
The percentage of companies with graduated voting was even higher for railways (88%), banks 
25(59%), insurance companies (49%), and docks (67%). In banking, textiles, insurance, and canals, 
approximately 40% of companies had maximum vote provisions.  
Yet, in the United States, although some companies used voting rights to protect small 
shareholders in the nineteenth century, abuses of the rights of minority shareholders were 
common and increased towards the turn of the twentieth century. Many of the protections 
afforded small investors during the first half of the nineteenth century were backed by state 
laws that incorporated specific voting or common-law provisions. Virginia, for example, 
mandated between 1849 and 1860 a graduated voting scale for all corporations (Dunlavy, 2004), 
and Massachusetts mandated a graduated voting scale for railways until the end of the 
nineteenth century (Dunlavy, 1998). But less regulated corporations such as manufacturing 
companies had ample leeway to include in their charters bylaws that would attract outside 
shareholders. Hilt (2007), for example, finds the use of graduated voting schemes and 
maximum votes to have been common in corporations chartered in New York in the early part 
of the nineteenth century, though he notes that ―far more common were firms controlled by 
directors holding or controlling large numbers of shares‖ (p. 30). 
By the 1880s, regulations mandating graduated voting in many of the most 
industrialized states of the United States had disappeared, most states beginning to mandate 
instead one-share, one-vote provisions (Dunlavy, 1998). Lamoreaux and Rosenthal (2006) find 
protection for minority shareholders to have been relatively weak during the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. Using an extensive set of court cases to show that directors and 
large shareholders ―engaged in a variety of…actions from which they benefited at the expense 
of their associates,‖ they argue that private benefits of control for insiders were large and 
positive because ―directors of corporations large and small frequently negotiated contracts with 
other companies in which they had a financial interest.‖ Even if bounded, these benefits were 
positive, and their ―magnitude seems if anything to have increased‖ (p. 147) over time. But even 
if private benefits of control were positive, investors continued to buy equity in American 
corporations because,  ―to the extent that these large projects also yielded returns that were high 
relative to government bonds or other similar assets, the private benefits of control that majority 
shareholders were able to extract were more an annoyance than a serious deterrent to 
investors‖ (Lamoreaux and Rosenthal, 2006, p. 148). 
 
26In civil law countries, the evidence is also mixed. For some of the countries for which 
detailed information at the company level is available, maximum vote provisions and 
graduated voting scales are known to have been common. For instance, more than one fourth of 
the companies in Brazil circa 1910 had maximum vote provisions. In fact, Musacchio (2007) 
shows that companies with maximum vote provisions had significantly lower concentration of 
ownership and control than companies without such provisions, and that, thanks to the lower 
ownership concentration in those companies, average ownership concentration before 1910 was 
lower than for any period in the twentieth century. In the case of Chile, Islas Rojas (2007) 
demonstrates that, notwithstanding the lack of protections for shareholders in Chile’s national 
laws, by the 1870s the Chilean stock market represented 17% of GDP (more than any other Latin 
American market at the time). Using all of the corporate charters issued in Chile from the 1850s 
to 1902, he shows that the majority of companies had relatively diffused ownership and strong 
firm-level protections for shareholders. Forty-five percent of the population of Chilean 
corporations chartered in the second half of the twentieth century had maximum vote 
provisions and nearly 10% graduated voting scales, and Islas Rojas estimates that most 
companies’ bylaws included about four of the shareholder protections identified in Table 10. It 
is perhaps because of these protections that ownership dispersion was common in Chilean 
corporations during the latter part of the nineteenth century. 
Miwa and Ramseyer (2000) show that in contrast to the concentrated ownership that 
characterizes Japanese companies today, the cotton industry in Japan between the 1880s and 
1890s had diffused ownership, firms having, on average, 331 shareholders. ―[T]he largest 
investors held about eight percent of the stock, the five largest together held 24 percent, and the 
10 largest held 33 percent… [I]n no firm did the largest shareholder hold 50 percent or more of 
the stock, and in only three firms did a shareholder hold 20 percent‖ (Miwa and Ramseyer, 
2000, p. 180). These corporations, according to the authors, attracted investors through charter 
provisions that aligned the incentives of managers with their firms (as by tying managerial pay 
to profits), by restricting managerial discretion ―by charter and statute,‖ and by hiring reputable 
industrialists to their boards of directors. For example, even though ―the Commercial Code 
provided a one-share-one-vote default rule, firms could legally reduce the voting power of the 
largest shareholders‖ (Miwa and Ramseyer, 2000, pp. 198–199) by, for example, adopting 
graduated voting scales. Miwa and Ramseyer estimate that before 1893, 112 out of 134 
27companies used some form of voting rights to restrict the power of large shareholders. This 
number decreased after 1893, but still 20% of companies used graduated voting between 1893 
and 1900. Finally, companies hired reputable industrialists to monitor their managers, knowing 
that their reputations were too valuable to them for these distinguished gentlemen to do a poor 
job. This last finding has been confirmed by Franks, Mayer, and Miyajima (2007), who argue 
that one way in which new corporations gained the trust of investors was by including among 
their founders either prominent industrialists or experienced and reputable investors. 
In Germany, the combination of strong laws mandating disclosure and actions of 
bankers on the boards of directors of large corporations helped to uphold the rights of minority 
shareholders. According to Franks, Mayer, and Wagner (2006), ownership concentration around 
1890 was at its lowest point until after 1950. Although the precise nature of the provisions 
included in corporate charters to protect shareholders is not known, the literature that studies 
corporate governance in Germany claims that corporations were motivated by the 
intermediation of universal banks to respect the interests of small shareholders. ―[S]ince banks 
acted as custodians of minority investors shares, they could also in principle encourage firms to 
uphold minority shareholders as well as their own interests‖ (Franks, Mayer, and Wagner, 2006, 
p. 582). According to O’Sullivan (2000, p. 237), to attract investors ―the banks encouraged 
industrial companies to maintain stable dividends.‖ Banks became custodians not only because 
accountholders wanted to purchase securities, but also because accountholders could buy and 
sell securities with other accountholders at the same bank without incurring the turnover tax 
imposed on exchange transactions in the market after 1894 (Fohlin, 2007). With the shares they 
had in custody, banks accumulated enough power to select directors and steer the direction of 
corporations to their benefit and that of their accountholders (Fohlin, 2007; Fear and Kobrak, 
2007). 
This does not imply that all firms in either common or civil law countries provided 
better shareholder protections or that ownership concentration was lower in countries that 
embraced any particular legal tradition. But it does question one channel through which we 
expect legal origin to determine clear differences across countries, namely investor protections. 
Perhaps the fact that most countries had weak protections in national laws did not operate in 
the same way in practices. For example, using ownership concentration in a country as a 
reflection of how protected are small shareholders from the abuses of managers and insiders, 
28LLS (1999) find systematic differences in the concentration of ownership and control in the 
largest companies of the world according to the legal tradition of their home country. They find 
that ownership dispersion is higher in common law countries, again with French civil law 
countries exhibiting the highest concentration of ownership in the world.  
The evidence of ownership concentration does not allow us to make bold statements 
about the differences in ownership concentration in civil and common law countries. For 
instance, Aganin and Volpin (2006) find in Italy before 1940 lower ownership concentration 
than during most of the twentieth century. Musacchio (2007) and Islas Rojas (2007) also find 
lower concentration of ownership in Brazil and Chile circa 1900 than today. And although 
France today has highly concentrated ownership, Hannah (2007a) argues that circa 1900, in 
sectors such as ‖railways, financials, and the Suez Canal,‖ there was widespread ownership 
dispersion (other sectors such as industrials exhibiting more concentrated ownership). 
Government guarantees in the French railway sector also help to explain why investors 
participated actively in the ownership of these large enterprises. Cohen (2007, p. 7) defends the 
idea that shareholders participated actively in the ownership of railways because shares 
―always carried government guarantees on their dividends, interest, and amortization, which 
insulated them from economic volatility.‖ In French commercial and government-supported 
banks, share ownership was also widely dispersed, as was the case in Crédit Foncier, which had 
―39,510 shareholders as early as 1900,‖ with an average holding of ―eight and a half shares‖ 
(Hannah, 2007a, p. 17). 
Common law countries such as the United States had the opposite experience. Whereas 
today we find wide ownership dispersion in most large publicly traded corporations, in the past 
ownership concentration seems to have been the rule rather than the exception. Lipartito and 
Morii (2007) maintain that the separation of ownership and control observed by Berle and 
Means (1932) in the early 1930s was not as pronounced as those researchers thought. Using data 
on the concentration of ownership in the 200 largest U.S. corporations, Lipartito and Morii make 
the case that the norm was concentrated ownership and almost no separation of ownership and 
control. Hannah (2007a) found tight ownership of controlling blocks in large corporations more 
common in the United States than in Europe circa 1900, especially among banking, insurance, 
mining, and industrial companies. Brecht and DeLong (2006) find the regulation of stock market 
activity and ownership dispersion that characterize American corporations today to be in sharp 
29contrast with the past, noting that ―before 1900 America did not lack for powerful family 
groups, for parent companies, or for financial intermediaries that aggressively embraced the 
role of monitoring and supervising corporate managers‖ (p. 614). 
In the case of Britain, too, it would be difficult to conclude that concentrated or diffused 
ownership prevailed. It would be safer to say that ownership took, as in French civil law 
countries, two distinct forms: family or tightly held, and widely held. Campbell and Turner 
(2007) observe that ―many of the publicly-traded companies in late Victorian Britain had 
diffused ownership. In particular, banks and railways.…‖ Banks tended to exhibit less 
concentrated ownership because some limited the proportion of equity that could be held by a 
single shareholder. Campbell and Turner (2007, pp. 4–5) report that ―shareholder constituencies 
exceeding 1,000 were typical in the following sectors: docks, gas, water, telegraph, and 
shipping,‖ but that despite evidence of diffused ownership in many companies in these sectors, 
―it is believed that many commercial and industrial publicly-traded companies in Victorian 
Britain had concentrated ownership.‖ Franks, Mayer, and Rossi’s (2004, 2006) research reveals 
family ownership to have been far more common in England at the turn of the twentieth 
century than today, and concentrated ownership to have been more common then as well. 
The evidence on investor protections and disclosure requirements across countries at the 
turn of the twentieth century thus does not allow us to draw clear lines separating along the 
lines of legal families the degree to which investors were protected in the past. The fragmentary 
evidence on ownership concentration also does not allow us to distinguish countries or legal 
families according to corporate governance practices, as is done today. For instance, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) find a clear separation between common law and French 
civil law countries (and civil law countries in general) with respect to concentration of 
ownership, something that would have been nearly impossible to do circa 1900 when common 
law countries had high ownership concentration and some civil law countries had lower 
ownership concentration. This evidence is still preliminary, but as more research is done on the 
history of corporate governance practices and financial development around the world, the 
evidence points more and more towards relative convergence rather than divergence across 
countries.  
30From Convergence to Divergence in the Twentieth Century 
If the evidence presented on investor protections in the past points in the direction of 
relative convergence or not so clear differences across countries, then it must be the case that 
most of the divergence took place in the twentieth century. Some countries embraced weak 
shareholder and creditor protections, concentrated ownership, business groups, and industrial 
concentration, others restricted ownership concentration and regulated the actions of powerful 
market participants such as large shareholders, managers, and investment bankers (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999; Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). In the United States, after the 
government eliminated the power of investment bankers to ―regulate‖ the financial market 
(because of the excessive concentration of power and poor results after the crash of 1929), the 
Securities and Exchange Commission was established and a strong mandate to protect small 
investors permeated the ideology of regulators and judges thereafter. In other countries such as 
Brazil, Canada, and India, and most countries in continental Europe, government action, new 
regulations, and changes in taxation led to concentrated ownership, large conglomerates 
dominating the corporate landscape, and somewhat concentrated markets for manufactures 
and some services (Morck, Percy, Tian, and Yeung, 2006; Khanna and Palepu, 2006; Rajan and 
Zingales, 2003; Pagano and Volpin, 2005). 
What explains, then, the divergence in financial development in the twentieth century? 
According to Rajan and Zingales (2003), much of the development of stock markets observed 
worldwide in 1913 was reversed in the course of the century, recovering (especially in civil law 
countries) only at the end of the 1990s. Analyzing this ―great reversal,‖ Rajan and Zingales 
observe that the reduction in capital and trade flows after WWI (especially in the 1930s) affected 
the development of financial markets and changed the incentives of domestic industrialists. In 
their interpretation of events, industrialists promoted the initial development of markets to 
finance the expansion of their operations in the face of the intense international competition that 
prevailed before World War I. But once they had become well established and international 
competition had become less intense, further development of credit and stock markets that 
facilitated entry by new competitors did not hold great appeal for them. Rajan and Zingales 
view the Great Depression as a key inflexion point because it generated a coordinated effort by 
governments worldwide to restrict capital flows and increase tariffs. In this scenario, labor and 
industrialists welcomed self-sufficiency. The latter lobbied for government policies that would 
31limit financial development, preferring a growth strategy whereby the source of corporate 
financing shifted largely from the stock markets to government subsidized loans. 
Other recent works have developed theoretical models that add an important nuance to 
the stylized model of Rajan and Zingales (2003). According to Perotti and von Thadden (2006), 
it was the reaction to the inflationary shock of the 1920s that caused the asymmetries observed 
today in investor protections and financial development, the intuition of their model being that 
the inflationary shock affected countries asymmetrically. In countries in which the median voter 
held equity and there was no strong inflationary shock, voters demanded improved regulation 
and strengthening of the control rights of dispersed equity holders. In countries in which the 
inflationary shock drastically reduced the financial holdings of the median voter, voters 
demanded that their labor income be protected, even at the expense of protections for outside 
shareholders. Albeit a highly stylized picture of what happened after WWI, this model suggests 
that post-war inflation eroded financial wealth and generated support for governance and 
regulation less concerned with protecting investors than with protecting labor, as reflected in 
bankruptcy laws that favored incumbent entrepreneurs and labor over creditors and a 
corporate governance system that emphasized stability even if it implied concentrated 
ownership, greater dependence on bank credit, and an important role for the government as an 
owner and controller of corporations. This view is rather convincing, but empirical tests to date 
have not been done with financial development indicators. Perotti and Schwienbacher (2007) 
develop such a test to explain the differences in pension funding schemes across countries, but 
they do not look at financial development. 
Recently, some papers have tried to link the current divergence in corporate governance 
across countries to differences in electoral systems. For instance, Pagano and Volpin (2005) 
argue that differences in shareholder protections in OECD countries can be explained by 
differences in their electoral systems. In proportional electoral systems, in which winning a 
majority of votes is crucial for competing parties, parties shape their platforms to the interests of 
large cohesive groups such as entrepreneurs and labor, thus favoring low investor protections 
and high labor protections. On the other hand, in majoritarian electoral systems in which the 
winner needs to win more districts, parties cater to the pivotal group, which could be the group 
of equity and bondholders (i.e., rentiers and unemployed and self-employed workers). The 
winning platform in this scenario is thus greater investor and lesser labor protections. As 
32powerful as this can be in explaining the differences in OECD countries, because many of the 
changes in corporate governance after the 1930s took place under authoritarian regimes (e.g., 
under Mussolini in Italy, Hitler in Germany, Vargas in Brazil, and others), we need an 
explanation that goes beyond electoral systems. 
Roe (2003) tried to explain differences in corporate governance in OECD countries using 
ideology (or how social democratic a country is), the idea being that concentrated ownership is 
a response not only to agency problems between owners and mangers, but also a reaction to the 
conflict between labor and the corporation. In societies in which labor has more power in the 
political system and in the system of corporate governance, concentrated ownership and less 
distance between principals and agents helped to mitigate conflicts between management and 
labor. 
Gourevitch and Shinn (2005) try to explain the divergence in corporate governance 
using a political model that applies to countries with different political regimes including 
authoritarian countries. For them, what matters is how in different countries in the twentieth 
century the preferences of owners, managers, and labor changed and shaped regulation to 
protect shareholders. In societies in which owners and workers were in conflict with managers, 
protections for shareholders are stronger and ownership is less concentrated. Yet, they argue 
that beyond shareholder protections there is, in some countries, greater coordination among 
individuals and groups (more ―degrees of coordination‖) that led to more concentrated 
ownership, greater reliance on bank credit, and strong state intervention.8 These authors, 
together with Rajan and Zingales (2003), Roe (2003), Pagano and Volpin (2005), and Perotti and 
von Thadden (2006), agree that if shareholder protections in national laws are the product of 
politics, to comprehend the divergence in investor protections and corporate governance 
regimes across countries we need to understand the political process and the shocks that caused 
a change in preferences as well as the interaction of politics and legal origins. 
Conclusions  
The evidence presented in this paper reveals three things. First, the data on financial 
development across countries in the first part of the twentieth century does not provide strong 
                                                       
8 See Peter A. Gourevitch  and James Shinn, Political Power & Corporate Control: The New Global 
Politics of Corporate Governance, Princeton, N.J. and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005. Their 
argument is summarized on pp. 10-11 and 277–278. 
33support for the persistence of effects of legal tradition hypothesis. That is, the significant 
differences observed today in financial development across legal traditions and legal families 
are not so clear when cross-sections in the past are examined. Neither the data on stock market 
capitalization to GDP, private credit to GDP, number of companies traded per million people, 
or bond market capitalization yield robust results to support the idea that there are clear 
differences in financial development across legal families. The only evidence that supports the 
persistence of effects hypothesis is associated with a rather unconventional measure of financial 
development, specifically, data on deposits per capita, which show common law countries to 
have had larger banking systems than countries that belonged to other legal families. Even if 
common law countries had larger financial markets according to some indicators, it is not clear 
they dominated in all of them.  
Second, whereas the law and finance literature argues that the differences observed in 
credit market development today are largely a product of clear differences in creditor 
protections contained in national laws (LLSV, 1998; Djankov, McLeish, and Shleifer, 2007), circa 
1910 we find convergence in the extent of creditor protections included in the bankruptcy laws 
of common and French civil law countries. The evidence on creditor rights thus does not 
support the persistence of effects hypothesis, but does support the idea of relative convergence 
in financial development across countries. 
Third, the evidence on shareholder rights at the turn of the twentieth century also shows 
that in most countries for which we have data, investor protections included in national 
company laws were weak. That is, there was convergence on weak shareholder rights in 
national laws across countries. The evidence makes it hard to discern clear differences in the 
level of investor protections by country because investors were protected from the abuses of 
managers and company insiders in the bylaws of many, but not all, of the largest corporations 
and through the actions of investment and universal banks. For instance, we find in countries 
belonging to all legal families companies that limited the power of large shareholders through 
the use of maximum vote provisions and graduated voting scales. But no legal family seems to 
have provided a specific set of rights that were unmatched in countries that belonged to other 
legal families. 
Thus, the evidence suggests that we do not have a clear idea on whether there were 
significant differences in financial development among countries of the different legal families. 
34Yet, investor protections and disclosure requirements at the time of the initial public offering, 
which are the main channels through which the literature assumes the systematic differences in 
financial development are generated, do not seem to have been that different across countries in 
the past.  Perhaps that these investor protections are not the actual channel through which legal 
origin is related to financial development.  
Now, obviously because the sample presented here is rather small, one could object to 
some of the implications of the findings of this paper. But it is not clear what the inclusion of 
other countries (mostly poor) would imply. Just because the sample includes mostly rich 
countries and the richest of the then ―emerging‖ economies, does that imply that we find no 
differences in financial development because the sample excludes poor countries? Is it then the 
case that legal origins have more perverse effects in those countries? If this is the case, then the 
theory that links legal origin to financial development needs to be expanded or revised to 
explain how the effects of legal traditions manifest themselves more clearly in poor economies. 
Perhaps there is an interaction effect with income that has not been taken into account. 
Furthermore, the findings of this paper do not imply that legal origin cannot be a 
significant explanatory variable of the differences observed in financial development today. 
Instead, they suggest a need for more research into how shocks of the twentieth century such as 
the inflationary shock after WWI and the Great Depression triggered a political process that led 
to state intervention and regulation, which ended up making legal origin matter more. Perhaps 
the divergence in financial development and investor protections in countries of different legal 
origins is related to the fact that in French civil law countries the lawmaking process is highly 
centralized, rendering it more easily captured by interest groups. In contrast, in common law 
countries judges have an easier time adapting the statutes and guaranteeing that the rules that 
work best in practice end up prevailing (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002; Beck, Demirguç-Kunt, and 
Levine, 2003a). Even if this is the case, the starting point for this adaptation process was not 
hundreds of years ago (when legal systems were introduced), but only a few decades ago, and, 
in any case, the effects of legal origin manifested themselves in the institutions that sustain 
financial development only after the political economy of these countries digested the shocks of 
the early part of the twentieth century. But even if this is the case and legal origin matters, we 
need a better explanation of why Canada and India ended up with concentrated ownership and 
weak investor protections whereas the United Kingdom and United States ended up with 
35ownership concentration and strong shareholder rights. Perhaps there are missing variables 
that need to be taken into account. For instance, Roe and Siegel (2007) find econometric 
evidence that in countries with more political instability financial markets are smaller, no matter 
their legal origin. In fact, after controlling for political instability, they find that the effects of 
legal origin in most of their regressions disappear.  
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41Appendix A. New Estimates of Stock Market Capitalization for the 
United Kingdom 
I estimated stock market capitalization for the United Kingdom in 1895, 1900, 1913, and 
1929 using all the quotations of the Investor’s Monthly Manual. Because the location information 
for each company was not standard, it was often difficult to determine the best domicile code. 
As a rule, I used the company headquarters as the domicile according to the information of 
Stock Exchange Official Intelligence.9 If a company seemed to be based in a country other than 
Britain or outside the empire because of the Stock Exchange Official Intelligence chapter in which 
it appears (e.g., Foreign Railways) or because of the title (e.g., Moscow-Windau-Rybinsk 
Railway), and no headquarters or head office was listed, but instead a London agent, I coded 
this security as foreign. If there was no other indication of a domicile (no office or agent address 
or description of financial/managerial home), but there was a description such as ―accounts 
submitted in London,‖ I coded the security as having the nationality of the location in which the 
accounts were submitted.10 
There are three striking features of the estimates of stock and bond market capitalization 
to GDP for the United Kingdom presented in Table 10-2. First, looking only at domestic stocks 
listed in stock markets of the United Kingdom, it can be seen that stock market capitalization to 
GDP was between 34% and 44% of GDP between 1895 and 1913. Second, the United Kingdom 
had a relatively large bond market for domestic corporate bonds. Third, the largest share of 
listings in the U.K. stock markets were of bonds from countries outside the British Empire. 
These findings explain why authors such as Sylla complained about the accuracy of the 
figures available for the United Kingdom. Stock markets in this nation seem to have been 
                                                       
9 All the information on headquarters is available at The stock exchange official intelligence for ... 
London: Spottiswoode, Ballantyne, 1899-1930. Using the headquarters as the main criteria to define 
nationality might overestimate the size of domestic issues in the United Kingdom, but this is not a 
problem as it biases upwards the estimate of average stock market capitalization for common law 
countries, thus going against my hypothesis of relative convergence across legal traditions circa 1913. 
10 Most often, the location information came from the address of the company headquarters, 
which could have been a street name, city name, province name, or country name (or none of these). In 
cases in which provinces in Australia (e.g., New South Wales, Transvaal, or British Colombia), Canada, 
New Zealand, and South Africa  were given as the location of the headquarters, I labeled them with the 
collective modern country name, and also coded them as part of the British Empire since their legal 
systems were extremely similar to those of the United Kingdom, and, according to Niall Ferguson, ―they 
retained the monarch as head of state and their foreign and defense policies were emphatically not 
independent.‖ Niall Ferguson, personal correspondence with the author, July 31, 2007.  
42smaller than the literature assumes. The problem is not that bonds were added to the stock 
market capitalization figures, but that the cross-listings to the stock market capitalization of the 
United Kingdom were added, which would not be a problem if what was being studied was not 
the relationship between national laws and the development of domestic markets. Because this 
is precisely what I am studying, I use the average estimates for stock market capitalization that 
take only domestic firms into account. 
Table A1 Estimates of Stock and Bond Market Capitalization, United Kingdom, 1895, 1900, 
1913, 1929 (at Market Prices by Origin of Listing  and as a % of GDP) 
   1895  1900  1913  1929 
Lower bound estimates of stock market capitalization     
Total stock market cap.  33.8  55.9  33.9  100.6 
Domestic  20.3  29.2  18.9  71.4 
British Empire  7.0  11.4  4.5  20.1 
Other countries  6.5  15.2  10.4  9.1 
Total corporate bonds  418.7  436.4  762.9  163.3 
Domestic  114.7  95.6  99.8  48.0 
British Empire  87.7  117.8  253.9  29.6 
Other countries  216.2  223.0  409.2  85.8 
Upper bound estimates of stock market capitalization     
Total stock market cap.  66.2  102.6  112.2  118.4 
Domestic  47.6  58.3  47.3  86.3 
British Empire  7.0  11.7  6.5  20.8 
Other countries  11.5  32.7  58.5  11.4 
Total corporate bonds  183.9  176.2  330.9  67.9 
Domestic  87.4  66.6  71.4  33.1 
British Empire  13.8  9.3  53.6  7.5 
Other countries  82.7  100.4  205.8  27.3 
Average estimates for the United Kingdom (domestic companies only) 
Stock market capitalization 
(avg.)  34.0  43.7  33.1  78.8 
Stock of corporate bonds (avg.)  101.1  81.1  85.6  40.5 
Note: The lower bound estimation of stock market capitalization assumes that all the securities 
difficult to identify as stocks or bonds are bonds; the upper bound estimation assumes them to be 
stocks. 
Source: Stock market capitalization is estimated using the capitalization and market prices from 
Investor’s Monthly Manual, London, 1895, 1900, 1913, and 1929 (estimated as total listed capital, paid 
up, times the ratio of market price to par/face value). GDP figures used to normalize the stock 
market capitalization are from Jones and Obstfeld (2001). 
 
Is there any way to know how far off these estimates are? Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton 
(2002, p. 23) estimate that the stock market capitalization of the London Stock Exchange at 
43market prices at the end of 1899 was $4.3 billion dollars, or about 46% of GDP. This is quite 
close to my average estimate of stock market capitalization for the United Kingdom of 43.7% of 
GDP in 1900. Sheppard (1971) estimated the total market value of all private securities quoted in 
London in 1900 and 1913 at $40 and $54 billion dollars in 1900 and 1913, respectively, which is 
equivalent to 435% and 445% of GDP. The sum of my estimates for those years (bonds plus 
stocks) equals 278.9%  and 443.1%, respectively. Although the 1900 estimate is lower in my case, 
our estimates for 1913 match up almost exactly.11  
                                                       
11 My estimates might be lower in 1900 because Sheppard’s estimates were taken directly from 
the The Stock Exchange Official Intelligence at market prices. I estimate stock market capitalization from the 
Investor’s Monthly Manual (IMM), and in cases in which no last price is reported I use either the face value 
or paid up value per share. Because for many companies that did not report a price or face value in the 
IMM, the paid up value is smaller than the face value, it might be possible that I underestimated the 
value of some companies in 1900. But if this were the case, why would my estimates match those of 
Dimson et al.? For Sheppard’s estimates, see Sheppard (1971), pp. 188–189. 
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Appendix B. Sources of Estimates of Stock Market Capitalization by Country 
Unless noted, all estimates of stock market capitalization for 1913 are from Rajan and Zingales, ―The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the 20th Century,‖ 
Journal of Financial Economics 69 (2003): 5-50, Table 3. Most of GDP data are from Matthew T. Jones and Maurice Obstfeld, "Saving, Investment, and Gold: A Reassessment of Historical 
Current Account Data," in Guillermo A. Calvo, Rudi Dornbusch, and Maurice Obstfeld (eds.) Money, Capital Mobility, and Trade: Essays in Honor of Robert Mundell, Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press, 2001, pp. 303-364, unless explicitly noted. 
Country  Source 
Argentina  Stock market capitalization for 1900 is estimated using the Argentine Yearbook 1902, Buenos Aires: J. Grant & Son, 1902 (which has the paid up capital for 
companies traded domestically at the end of 1902), converted to market prices using the annual report of the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange from Bolsa de 
Comercio de Buenos Aires, Boletin Oficial de la Bolsa de Comercio de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, 1903.  
Australia  Stock market capitalization to GDP for 1900 is from Leslie Hannah, "Why were African and European stock markets "better developed" than American and 
Asian ones in 1900?" presented at the Asia-Pacific Economic and Social History Meeting, Sydney, February 2007 (data are for Sydney only). 
Austria  The estimate for 1900 is from Alfred Neymarck, ―La Statistique Internationale des Valeurs Mobilières,‖ in Bulletin de l’Institute International de Statistitque vols. 
XIV, 1903 (the data likely reflect the capitalization in 1901). GDP for Austria-Hungary is from Marc Flandreau and Frédréric Zumer, The Making of Global 
Finance, 1880-1913, OECD: Paris, 2004, Table 12. 
Belgium  Stock market capitalization for 1900 is estimated using Raymond Goldsmith, Comparative National Balance Sheets: A Study of Twenty Countries, 1688-1978, 
Appendix A.  
Brazil  For a complete description of methodology and sources, see Appendix 2A (Chapter 2). 
Canada  Stock market capitalization for 1900 is from Raymond Goldsmith, Comparative National Balance Sheets: A Study of Twenty Countries, 1688-1978, Appendix A. 
Chile  Stock market data are from Ignacio Briones, "Capital Market Development and Economic Performance: A General Overview of the Chilean Experience 1870 –
1995," paper presented at the European Historical Economics Society (EHES), Summer School, Trinity College, Ireland, 2001. Data for 1900 are actually for 
1902. All GDP and exchange rate data are from Juan Braun, Matias Braun, Ignacio Briones, José Díaz, Rolf Lüders, and Gert Wagner, ―Economía Chilena 1810–
1996,‖ Pontifícia Universidad Católica de Chile, Instituto de Economía, Working Paper 187, January 2000, Sections I.I and IV.I.4. 
Egypt  Data for 1902 and 1913 are from Arthur Edwin Crouchley, Investment of Foreign Capital in Egyptian Companies and Public Debt, New York: Arno Press, 1977, p. 
152, and national income estimates are from Robert L. Tignor, State, Private Enterprise, and Economic Change in Egypt, 1918-1952, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1984, p. 25. 
France  Stock market capitalization is from Antoine Bozio, ―La Capitalization Boursière en France au XXe Si￨cle,‖ unpublished masters’ thesis, Ecole Normale 
Supérieure, ENSAE, Ecole Polytechnique, 2002. GDP is from Maurice Levy-Leboyer and François Bourguignon, l'Economie Française au XIXe siècle: Analyse 
macro-économique, Economica, Paris, 1985. 
Germany  Stock market capitalization for 1900 is from Raymond Goldsmith, Comparative National Balance Sheets: A Study of Twenty Countries, 1688-1978, Appendix A. 
Greece  Stock market capitalization is from Alfred Neymarck, ―La Statistique Internationale des Valeurs Mobili￨res,‖ in Bulletin de l’Institute International de Statistitque 
XIV, Book 2, 1903, pp. 312--313. GDP estimates are from Marc Flandreau and Frédréric Zumer, The Making of Global Finance, 1880-1913, Table 12.  
India  Data for 1900 are from Raymond Goldsmith, Comparative National Balance Sheets: A Study of Twenty Countries, 1688-1978, Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press, 1985, Appendix A.  




Country  Source 
Japan  Stock market capitalization for 1900 is from Raymond Goldsmith, Comparative National Balance Sheets: A Study of Twenty Countries, 1688-1978, Appendix A. GDP 
is from Global Financial Data. 
South Africa  1913 estimates represent the market capitalization of all stocks traded at the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and are from the database Lyndon Moore used for 
his paper, ―The Effect of World War One on Stock Market Integration,‖ mimeo Victoria University of Wellington, 2006. 
Switzerland  Stock market capitalization for 1900 and 1913 is from Raymond Goldsmith, Comparative National Balance Sheets: A Study of Twenty Countries, 1688-1978, 
Appendix A. GDP and exchange rates are from Marc Flandreau and Frédréric Zumer, The Making of Global Finance, 1880-1913, OECD: Paris, 2004, Table 12. 
United Kingdom  See Appendix A. 
United States  Estimates for 1900 and 1913 are from Raymond Goldsmith, Comparative National Balance Sheets: A Study of Twenty Countries, 1688-1978, Appendix A, as 
suggested by Richard Sylla, ―Schumpeter Redux: A Review of Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales’s Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists.‖ Journal of 
Economic Literature 44 (June 2006): 391–404. 
Uruguay  For Uruguay, the estimates are from Uruguay, Anuario Estadistico de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay 1915, Montevideo 1917 (GDP estimates are from Luis 
Bértola, El PIB de Uruguay 1870-1936 y otras estimaciones. Montevideo, FCS-CSIC, 1998). 
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Appendix C. Sources of Estimates of the Stock of Bonds by Country 
Unless noted below, all estimates of the stock of bonds are from Goldsmith (1985) and all of the GDP estimates from Jones and Obstfeld (2001). 
Country  Source 
Argentina  I use the scant data on bonds quoted in Buenos Aires obtained from the Boletin de la Bolsa de Buenos Aires 1902 and 1913 and the Argentine Yearbook, 1902 and 1914. 
Australia  1895 and 1900 bond and GDP data for Australia are from Davis and Gallman, Evolving Financial Markets, Table 5, pp. 4–8 (1895 estimated using the 1889 data over 
1895 GDP); 1913 data were estimated by adding the new issues of bonds in Australia from 1900 to 1913 from Drummond, Capital Markets, Table B, p. 293 (this is 
clearly an overestimate). 
Austria  Data for 1900 are from Alfred Neymarck, Congrès des Valeurs Mobilières.  4 vols.,  Paris: Impremerie Paul Dupont, 1915, Tome I, and for 1913 I used the 1912 estimate 
from Alfred Neymarck, ―La Statistique Internationale des Valeurs Mobili￨res,‖ Bulletin de l’Institute International de Statistitque,  Vol. XX, Tome II, Vienna: 
Imprimerie Frederic Jaspers, 1915. GDP for Austria-Hungary is from Marc Flandreau and Frédréric Zumer, The Making of Global Finance, 1880-1913, OECD: Paris, 
2004, Table 12. 
Belgium  Data for Belgium for 1895 and 1900 are based on estimates of Alfred Neymarck, Congrès des Valeurs Mobilières,  4 vols.,  Paris: Impremerie Paul Dupont, 1915, Tome 
I; data for 1913 were kindly provided by Marc Deloof and Franz Bulens using the SCOB Database, University of Antwerp, Belgium. 
Brazil  See Aldo Musacchio, Experiments in Financial Democracy: Corporate Governance and Financial Development in Brazil, 1882–1950, unpublished book manuscript, Harvard 
Business School, 2007, Appendix 2A. 
Canada  1913 figure uses 1912 estimate of the stock of bonds from E. R. Wood, Review of the Bond Market in Canada…  Montreal: Dominion Securities Corporation, 1911–1914. 
Egypt  Data for 1902 and 1913 are from Arthur Edwin Crouchley, Investment of Foreign Capital in Egyptian Companies and Public Debt, New York: Arno Press, 1977, p. 152, 
and national income estimates from Robert L. Tignor, State, Private Enterprise, and Economic Change in Egypt, 1918-1952, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1984, p. 25. 
France  High boundary estimates for France are from Mich￨le Saint Marc, ―Introduction aux Statistiques Monétaires et Financières Françaises (1807-1970),‖ Revue 
International d’Histoire de la Banque 8 (1974), pp. 72–104 (this is an overestimate because it counts railway bonds with government guarantees and foreign railway 
bonds). The low boundary estimates are from Hautcoeur, ―Le March￩‖ (includes bonds traded or registered in Paris, either at the parquet or the coulisse, and 
excludes French colonial companies, foreign companies, and companies with government guaranteed dividends or bonds). For most statistical analyses, I take the 
average of these two estimates. 
Germany  All data are from Deutsche Bundesbank, Deutsches Geld- und Bankwesen in Zahlen 1873-1975, Deutsche Bundesbank: Frankfurt A.M., 1976, Table 1.01a.  
Japan  Data for 1910 are from Alfred Neymarck, ―La Statistique Internationale des Valeurs Mobilières,‖ Bulletin de l’Institute International de Statistitque, Vol. XIX. Vienna: 
Imprimerie Frederic Jaspers, 1914. 
South Africa  For South Africa, the estimate of bonds for 1913 is from Union of South Africa, Official Year Book, No. 2, 1918, p. 729 (this is clearly an overestimate because it counts 
all bonds registered in South Africa; Lyndon Moore found no bonds traded on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange). 
Spain  1900 represents data from 1902 obtained from Alfred Neymarck, ―La Statistique Internationale des Valeurs Mobilières,‖ in Bulletin de l’Institute International de 
Statistitque XIV, Book 2, 1903, p. 388; data for 1913 use the figure for 1911 obtained from vol. XX. GDP is from Leandro Prados de la Escosura, El Progreso Económico 
de España 1850-2000, Madrid, Fundación BBVA, 2003. 
U. Kingdom  See Appendix A. 
Uruguay  Anuario Estadistico de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay 1915, Montevideo 1917 (and GDP estimates from Bértola, El PIB de Uruguay, 1998). 
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Appendix D The Leading Stock Exchanges in the World and the Representativeness of the Stock 
Exchange Data Used in the Paper 
      In current sample 1900 or 1913       




process  Missing 
Common law (n=10)    In sample or missing  6  0  5 
Australia  Melbourne, Sydney, Wellington  All?  1     
Burma  Rangoon        1 
Canada  Montreal, Toronto  All  1     
Ceylon  Colombo        1 
India  Bombay, Calcutta  Bombay, Calcutta  1     
Malaya  Singapore        1 
New Zealand  Wellington        1 
Rhodesia  Bulawayo        1 
South Africa  Johannesburg  Johannesburg  1     
United Kingdom  London, Liverpool, etc.  All in IMM  1     
USA 
NYSE, Boston, Chicago, San Francisco, 
L.A., Philadelphia  All?  1       
German civil law (n=6)    In sample or missing  4  1  1 
Austria-Hungary  Vienna, Budapest, Prague  Vienna  1     
Bulgaria  Sofia  Sofia    1   
Germany  Berlin, Frankfurt  All  1     
Japan  Tokyo, Osaka, Yokohama  All?  1     
Serbiaa  Belgrade        1 
Switzerland  Geneva, Zurich  All?  1       
Scandinavian civil law (n=4)  In sample or missing  3  2  1 
Denmark  Copenhagen  Copenhagen  1     
Finland  Helsinki        1 
Norway  Oslo  Oslo  1     
Sweden  Stockholm  Stockholm  1     
Russian civil law (n=1)    In sample or missing    1   
Russia  St. Petersburg, Moscow        1    
a Most companies were traded on the Vienna Stock Exchange. 
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Appendix D. The Leading Stock Exchanges in the World circa 1913 and the Representativeness of the Sample Used in the Paper (continues). 
      In current sample 1900 or 1913       




process  Missing 
           
French civil law (n=21)    In sample or missing  13  2  6 
Belgium  Brussels  Brussels  1     
France  Paris, Lyon, Marseille  All  1     
Greece  Athens  Athens  1     
Italy  Milan, Genoa  Mostly Milan  1     
Netherlands  Amsterdam  All  1     
Portugal  Lisbon        1 
Rumania  Bucharest        1 
Spain  Madrid, Barcelona  All?  1     
Egypt  Alexandria, Cairo  Alexandria  1     
Morocco  Casablanca        1 
Mozambique  Beira        1 
Argentina  Buenos Aires  Buenos Aires  1     
Brazil  Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo  Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo  1     
Chile  Santiago and Valparaiso  Santiago and Valparaiso  1     
Cuba  Havana  Havana  1     
México 
Mexico City, Monterrey, 
Guadalajara      1   
Perú  Lima  Lima  1     
Uruguay  Montevideo  Montevideo  1     
Venezuela  Caracas        1 
Indonesia  Batavia        1 
Turkey  Istanbul        1    
Total countries = 51     Total in sample  or missing  26  4  21 
Source: Michie (2006), with some additions.         
 
49Appendix A. New Estimates of Stock Market Capitalization for the 
United Kingdom 
I estimated stock market capitalization for the United Kingdom in 1895, 1900, 1913, and 
1929 using all the quotations of the Investor’s Monthly Manual. Because the location information 
for each company was not standard, it was often difficult to determine the best domicile code. 
As a rule, I used the company headquarters as the domicile according to the information of 
Stock Exchange Official Intelligence.9 If a company seemed to be based in a country other than 
Britain or outside the empire because of the Stock Exchange Official Intelligence chapter in which 
it appears (e.g., Foreign Railways) or because of the title (e.g., Moscow-Windau-Rybinsk 
Railway), and no headquarters or head office was listed, but instead a London agent, I coded 
this security as foreign. If there was no other indication of a domicile (no office or agent address 
or description of financial/managerial home), but there was a description such as “accounts 
submitted in London,” I coded the security as having the nationality of the location in which the 
accounts were submitted.10
These findings explain why authors such as Sylla complained about the accuracy of the 
figures available for the United Kingdom. Stock markets in this nation seem to have been 
 
There are three striking features of the estimates of stock and bond market capitalization 
to GDP for the United Kingdom presented in Table 10-2. First, looking only at domestic stocks 
listed in stock markets of the United Kingdom, it can be seen that stock market capitalization to 
GDP was between 34% and 44% of GDP between 1895 and 1913. Second, the United Kingdom 
had a relatively large bond market for domestic corporate bonds. Third, the largest share of 
listings in the U.K. stock markets were of bonds from countries outside the British Empire. 
9 All the information on headquarters is available at The stock exchange official intelligence for ... 
London: Spottiswoode, Ballantyne, 1899-1930. Using the headquarters as the main criteria to define 
nationality might overestimate the size of domestic issues in the United Kingdom, but this is not a 
problem as it biases upwards the estimate of average stock market capitalization for common law 
countries, thus going against my hypothesis of relative convergence across legal traditions circa 1913. 
10 Most often, the location information came from the address of the company headquarters, 
which could have been a street name, city name, province name, or country name (or none of these). In 
cases in which provinces in Australia (e.g., New South Wales, Transvaal, or British Colombia), Canada, 
New Zealand, and South Africa  were given as the location of the headquarters, I labeled them with the 
collective modern country name, and also coded them as part of the British Empire since their legal 
systems were extremely similar to those of the United Kingdom, and, according to Niall Ferguson, “they 
retained the monarch as head of state and their foreign and defense policies were emphatically not 
independent.” Niall Ferguson, personal correspondence with the author, July 31, 2007.  
50smaller than the literature assumes. The problem is not that bonds were added to the stock 
market capitalization figures, but that the cross-listings to the stock market capitalization of the 
United Kingdom were added, which would not be a problem if what was being studied was not 
the relationship between national laws and the development of domestic markets. Because this 
is precisely what I am studying, I use the average estimates for stock market capitalization that 
take only domestic firms into account. 
Table A1 Estimates of Stock and Bond Market Capitalization, United Kingdom, 1895, 1900, 
1913, 1929 (at Market Prices by Origin of Listing  and as a % of GDP) 
   1895  1900  1913  1929 
Lower bound estimates of stock market capitalization     
Total stock market cap.  33.8  55.9  33.9  100.6 
Domestic  20.3  29.2  18.9  71.4 
British Empire  7.0  11.4  4.5  20.1 
Other countries  6.5  15.2  10.4  9.1 
Total corporate bonds  418.7  436.4  762.9  163.3 
Domestic  114.7  95.6  99.8  48.0 
British Empire  87.7  117.8  253.9  29.6 
Other countries  216.2  223.0  409.2  85.8 
Upper bound estimates of stock market capitalization     
Total stock market cap.  66.2  102.6  112.2  118.4 
Domestic  47.6  58.3  47.3  86.3 
British Empire  7.0  11.7  6.5  20.8 
Other countries  11.5  32.7  58.5  11.4 
Total corporate bonds  183.9  176.2  330.9  67.9 
Domestic  87.4  66.6  71.4  33.1 
British Empire  13.8  9.3  53.6  7.5 
Other countries  82.7  100.4  205.8  27.3 
Average estimates for the United Kingdom (domestic companies only) 
Stock market capitalization 
(avg.)  34.0  43.7  33.1  78.8 
Stock of corporate bonds (avg.)  101.1  81.1  85.6  40.5 
Note: The lower bound estimation of stock market capitalization assumes that all the securities 
difficult to identify as stocks or bonds are bonds; the upper bound estimation assumes them to be 
stocks. 
Source: Stock market capitalization is estimated using the capitalization and market prices from 
Investor’s Monthly Manual, London, 1895, 1900, 1913, and 1929 (estimated as total listed capital, paid 
up, times the ratio of market price to par/face value). GDP figures used to normalize the stock 
market capitalization are from Jones and Obstfeld (2001). 
 
Is there any way to know how far off these estimates are? Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton 
(2002, p. 23) estimate that the stock market capitalization of the London Stock Exchange at 
51market prices at the end of 1899 was $4.3 billion dollars, or about 46% of GDP. This is quite 
close to my average estimate of stock market capitalization for the United Kingdom of 43.7% of 
GDP in 1900. Sheppard (1971) estimated the total market value of all private securities quoted in 
London in 1900 and 1913 at $40 and $54 billion dollars in 1900 and 1913, respectively, which is 
equivalent to 435% and 445% of GDP. The sum of my estimates for those years (bonds plus 
stocks) equals 278.9%  and 443.1%, respectively. Although the 1900 estimate is lower in my case, 
our estimates for 1913 match up almost exactly.11
11 My estimates might be lower in 1900 because Sheppard’s estimates were taken directly from 
the The Stock Exchange Official Intelligence at market prices. I estimate stock market capitalization from the 
Investor’s Monthly Manual (IMM), and in cases in which no last price is reported I use either the face value 
or paid up value per share. Because for many companies that did not report a price or face value in the 
IMM, the paid up value is smaller than the face value, it might be possible that I underestimated the 
value of some companies in 1900. But if this were the case, why would my estimates match those of 
Dimson et al.? For Sheppard’s estimates, see Sheppard (1971), pp. 188–189. 
  
52Appendix B. Sources of Estimates of Stock Market Capitalization by Country 
Unless noted, all estimates of stock market capitalization for 1913 are from Rajan and Zingales, “The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the 20th
Country 
 Century,” 
Journal of Financial Economics 69 (2003): 5-50, Table 3. Most of GDP data are from Matthew T. Jones and Maurice Obstfeld, "Saving, Investment, and Gold: A Reassessment of Historical 
Current Account Data," in Guillermo A. Calvo, Rudi Dornbusch, and Maurice Obstfeld (eds.) Money, Capital Mobility, and Trade: Essays in Honor of Robert Mundell, Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press, 2001, pp. 303-364, unless explicitly noted. 
Source 
Argentina  Stock market capitalization for 1900 is estimated using the Argentine Yearbook 1902, Buenos Aires: J. Grant & Son, 1902 (which has the paid up capital for 
companies traded domestically at the end of 1902), converted to market prices using the annual report of the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange from Bolsa de 
Comercio de Buenos Aires, Boletin Oficial de la Bolsa de Comercio de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, 1903.  
Australia  Stock market capitalization to GDP for 1900 is from Leslie Hannah, "Why were African and European stock markets "better developed" than American and 
Asian ones in 1900?" presented at the Asia-Pacific Economic and Social History Meeting, Sydney, February 2007 (data are for Sydney only). 
Austria  The estimate for 1900 is from Alfred Neymarck, “La Statistique Internationale des Valeurs Mobilières,” in Bulletin de l’Institute International de Statistitque vols. 
XIV, 1903 (the data likely reflect the capitalization in 1901). GDP for Austria-Hungary is from Marc Flandreau and Frédréric Zumer, The Making of Global 
Finance, 1880-1913, OECD: Paris, 2004, Table 12. 
Belgium  Stock market capitalization for 1900 is estimated using Raymond Goldsmith, Comparative National Balance Sheets: A Study of Twenty Countries, 1688-1978, 
Appendix A.  
Brazil  For a complete description of methodology and sources, see Appendix 2A (Chapter 2). 
Canada  Stock market capitalization for 1900 is from Raymond Goldsmith, Comparative National Balance Sheets: A Study of Twenty Countries, 1688-1978, Appendix A. 
Chile  Stock market data are from Ignacio Briones, "Capital Market Development and Economic Performance: A General Overview of the Chilean Experience 1870 –
1995," paper presented at the European Historical Economics Society (EHES), Summer School, Trinity College, Ireland, 2001. Data for 1900 are actually for 
1902. All GDP and exchange rate data are from Juan Braun, Matias Braun, Ignacio Briones, José Díaz, Rolf Lüders, and Gert Wagner, “Economía Chilena 1810–
1996,” Pontifícia Universidad Católica de Chile, Instituto de Economía, Working Paper 187, January 2000, Sections I.I and IV.I.4. 
Egypt  Data for 1902 and 1913 are from Arthur Edwin Crouchley, Investment of Foreign Capital in Egyptian Companies and Public Debt, New York: Arno Press, 1977, p. 
152, and national income estimates are from Robert L. Tignor, State, Private Enterprise, and Economic Change in Egypt, 1918-1952, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1984, p. 25. 
France  Stock market capitalization is from Antoine Bozio, “La Capitalization Boursière en France au XXe Siècle,” unpublished masters’ thesis, Ecole Normale 
Supérieure, ENSAE, Ecole Polytechnique, 2002. GDP is from Maurice Levy-Leboyer and François Bourguignon, l'Economie Française au XIXe siècle: Analyse 
macro-économique, Economica, Paris, 1985. 
Germany  Stock market capitalization for 1900 is from Raymond Goldsmith, Comparative National Balance Sheets: A Study of Twenty Countries, 1688-1978, Appendix A. 
Greece  Stock market capitalization is from Alfred Neymarck, “La Statistique Internationale des Valeurs Mobilières,” in Bulletin de l’Institute International de Statistitque 
XIV, Book 2, 1903, pp. 312--313. GDP estimates are from Marc Flandreau and Frédréric Zumer, The Making of Global Finance, 1880-1913, Table 12.  
India  Data for 1900 are from Raymond Goldsmith, Comparative National Balance Sheets: A Study of Twenty Countries, 1688-1978, Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press, 1985, Appendix A.  
Italy  Stock market capitalization for 1900 is estimated using Raymond Goldsmith, Comparative National Balance Sheets: A Study of Twenty Countries, 1688-1978, 
Appendix A. 
53 
Country  Source 
Japan  Stock market capitalization for 1900 is from Raymond Goldsmith, Comparative National Balance Sheets: A Study of Twenty Countries, 1688-1978, Appendix A. GDP 
is from Global Financial Data. 
South Africa  1913 estimates represent the market capitalization of all stocks traded at the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and are from the database Lyndon Moore used for 
his paper, “The Effect of World War One on Stock Market Integration,” mimeo Victoria University of Wellington, 2006. 
Switzerland  Stock market capitalization for 1900 and 1913 is from Raymond Goldsmith, Comparative National Balance Sheets: A Study of Twenty Countries, 1688-1978, 
Appendix A. GDP and exchange rates are from Marc Flandreau and Frédréric Zumer, The Making of Global Finance, 1880-1913, OECD: Paris, 2004, Table 12. 
United Kingdom  See Appendix A. 
United States  Estimates for 1900 and 1913 are from Raymond Goldsmith, Comparative National Balance Sheets: A Study of Twenty Countries, 1688-1978, Appendix A, as 
suggested by Richard Sylla, “Schumpeter Redux: A Review of Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales’s Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists.” Journal of 
Economic Literature 44 (June 2006): 391–404. 
Uruguay  For Uruguay, the estimates are from Uruguay, Anuario Estadistico de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay 1915, Montevideo 1917 (GDP estimates are from Luis 
Bértola, El PIB de Uruguay 1870-1936 y otras estimaciones. Montevideo, FCS-CSIC, 1998). 
54Appendix C. Sources of Estimates of the Stock of Bonds by Country 
Unless noted below, all estimates of the stock of bonds are from Goldsmith (1985) and all of the GDP estimates from Jones and Obstfeld (2001). 
Country  Source 
Argentina  I use the scant data on bonds quoted in Buenos Aires obtained from the Boletin de la Bolsa de Buenos Aires 1902 and 1913 and the Argentine Yearbook, 1902 and 1914. 
Australia  1895 and 1900 bond and GDP data for Australia are from Davis and Gallman, Evolving Financial Markets, Table 5, pp. 4–8 (1895 estimated using the 1889 data over 
1895 GDP); 1913 data were estimated by adding the new issues of bonds in Australia from 1900 to 1913 from Drummond, Capital Markets, Table B, p. 293 (this is 
clearly an overestimate). 
Austria  Data for 1900 are from Alfred Neymarck, Congrès des Valeurs Mobilières.  4 vols.,  Paris: Impremerie Paul Dupont, 1915, Tome I, and for 1913 I used the 1912 estimate 
from Alfred Neymarck, “La Statistique Internationale des Valeurs Mobilières,” Bulletin de l’Institute International de Statistitque,  Vol. XX, Tome II, Vienna: 
Imprimerie Frederic Jaspers, 1915. GDP for Austria-Hungary is from Marc Flandreau and Frédréric Zumer, The Making of Global Finance, 1880-1913, OECD: Paris, 
2004, Table 12. 
Belgium  Data for Belgium for 1895 and 1900 are based on estimates of Alfred Neymarck, Congrès des Valeurs Mobilières,  4 vols.,  Paris: Impremerie Paul Dupont, 1915, Tome 
I; data for 1913 were kindly provided by Marc Deloof and Franz Bulens using the SCOB Database, University of Antwerp, Belgium. 
Brazil  See Aldo Musacchio, Experiments in Financial Democracy: Corporate Governance and Financial Development in Brazil, 1882–1950, unpublished book manuscript, Harvard 
Business School, 2007, Appendix 2A. 
Canada  1913 figure uses 1912 estimate of the stock of bonds from E. R. Wood, Review of the Bond Market in Canada…  Montreal: Dominion Securities Corporation, 1911–1914. 
Egypt  Data for 1902 and 1913 are from Arthur Edwin Crouchley, Investment of Foreign Capital in Egyptian Companies and Public Debt, New York: Arno Press, 1977, p. 152, 
and national income estimates from Robert L. Tignor, State, Private Enterprise, and Economic Change in Egypt, 1918-1952, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1984, p. 25. 
France  High boundary estimates for France are from Michèle Saint Marc, “Introduction aux Statistiques Monétaires et Financières Françaises (1807-1970),” Revue 
International d’Histoire de la Banque 8 (1974), pp. 72–104 (this is an overestimate because it counts railway bonds with government guarantees and foreign railway 
bonds). The low boundary estimates are from Hautcoeur, “Le Marché” (includes bonds traded or registered in Paris, either at the parquet or the coulisse, and 
excludes French colonial companies, foreign companies, and companies with government guaranteed dividends or bonds). For most statistical analyses, I take the 
average of these two estimates. 
Germany  All data are from Deutsche Bundesbank, Deutsches Geld- und Bankwesen in Zahlen 1873-1975, Deutsche Bundesbank: Frankfurt A.M., 1976, Table 1.01a.  
Japan  Data for 1910 are from Alfred Neymarck, “La Statistique Internationale des Valeurs Mobilières,” Bulletin de l’Institute International de Statistitque, Vol. XIX. Vienna: 
Imprimerie Frederic Jaspers, 1914. 
South Africa  For South Africa, the estimate of bonds for 1913 is from Union of South Africa, Official Year Book, No. 2, 1918, p. 729 (this is clearly an overestimate because it counts 
all bonds registered in South Africa; Lyndon Moore found no bonds traded on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange). 
Spain  1900 represents data from 1902 obtained from Alfred Neymarck, “La Statistique Internationale des Valeurs Mobilières,” in Bulletin de l’Institute International de 
Statistitque XIV, Book 2, 1903, p. 388; data for 1913 use the figure for 1911 obtained from vol. XX. GDP is from Leandro Prados de la Escosura, El Progreso Económico 
de España 1850-2000, Madrid, Fundación BBVA, 2003. 
U. Kingdom  See Appendix A. 
Uruguay  Anuario Estadistico de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay 1915, Montevideo 1917 (and GDP estimates from Bértola, El PIB de Uruguay, 1998). 
55Appendix D The Leading Stock Exchanges in the World and the Representativeness of the Stock 
Exchange Data Used in the Paper 
      In current sample 1900 or 1913       




process  Missing 
Common law (n=10)    In sample or missing  6  0  5 
Australia  Melbourne, Sydney, Wellington  All?  1     
Burma  Rangoon        1 
Canada  Montreal, Toronto  All  1     
Ceylon  Colombo        1 
India  Bombay, Calcutta  Bombay, Calcutta  1     
Malaya  Singapore        1 
New Zealand  Wellington        1 
Rhodesia  Bulawayo        1 
South Africa  Johannesburg  Johannesburg  1     
United Kingdom  London, Liverpool, etc.  All in IMM  1     
USA 
NYSE, Boston, Chicago, San Francisco, 
L.A., Philadelphia  All?  1       
German civil law (n=6)    In sample or missing  4  1  1 
Austria-Hungary  Vienna, Budapest, Prague  Vienna  1     
Bulgaria  Sofia  Sofia    1   
Germany  Berlin, Frankfurt  All  1     
Japan  Tokyo, Osaka, Yokohama  All?  1     
Serbia Belgrade  a        1 
Switzerland  Geneva, Zurich  All?  1       
Scandinavian civil law (n=4)  In sample or missing  3  2  1 
Denmark  Copenhagen  Copenhagen  1     
Finland  Helsinki        1 
Norway  Oslo  Oslo  1     
Sweden  Stockholm  Stockholm  1     
Russian civil law (n=1)    In sample or missing    1   
Russia  St. Petersburg, Moscow        1    
a Most companies were traded on the Vienna Stock Exchange. 
56Appendix D. The Leading Stock Exchanges in the World circa 1913 and the Representativeness of the Sample Used in the Paper (continues). 
      In current sample 1900 or 1913       




process  Missing 
           
French civil law (n=21)    In sample or missing  13  2  6 
Belgium  Brussels  Brussels  1     
France  Paris, Lyon, Marseille  All  1     
Greece  Athens  Athens  1     
Italy  Milan, Genoa  Mostly Milan  1     
Netherlands  Amsterdam  All  1     
Portugal  Lisbon        1 
Rumania  Bucharest        1 
Spain  Madrid, Barcelona  All?  1     
Egypt  Alexandria, Cairo  Alexandria  1     
Morocco  Casablanca        1 
Mozambique  Beira        1 
Argentina  Buenos Aires  Buenos Aires  1     
Brazil  Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo  Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo  1     
Chile  Santiago and Valparaiso  Santiago and Valparaiso  1     
Cuba  Havana  Havana  1     
México 
Mexico City, Monterrey, 
Guadalajara      1   
Perú  Lima  Lima  1     
Uruguay  Montevideo  Montevideo  1     
Venezuela  Caracas        1 
Indonesia  Batavia        1 
Turkey  Istanbul        1    
Total countries = 51     Total in sample  or missing  26  4  21 
Source: Michie (2006), with some additions.         
 
57Panel A: Financial development indicators and means by legal family, 1900 and 1913












1999 1913 1913 1913 1900 1900 1913 1913 1913
Common law 1.30 0.53 0.64 0.44 0.36 0.36 0.27 0.71 25.2
Australia 1.13 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.01 0.01 61.7
Canada 1.22 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.23 0.10 0.42 14.7
India 0.46 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.8
South Africa 1.20 0.22 0.04 0.40 22.4
United Kingdom 2.25 1.09 1.09 0.33 0.44 0.81 0.86 1.07 47.1
United States 1.52 0.39 0.95 0.95 0.71 0.26 0.37 0.96 4.8
German civil law 1.26 0.57 0.57 0.73 0.46 0.19 0.12 1.04 33.9
Austria 0.17 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.50 0.21 0.20 38.7
Germany 0.67 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.20 0.06 0.07 1.66 28.0
Japan 0.95 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.32 0.05 0.02 0.58 7.5
Switzerland 3.23 0.58 0.58 1.23 0.82 0.46 0.18 0.88 61.5
French civil law 0.81 0.71 0.40 0.37 0.32 0.14 0.15 0.74 28.7
Argentina 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.01 0.01 0.37 15.3
Belgium 0.82 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.65 0.17 0.25 1.00 108.7
Brazil 0.45 0.25 0.25 0.20 0.17 0.05 0.15 0.38 12.4
Chile 1.05 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.10 20.6
Cuba 2.19 0.33 0.33 12.7
Egypt 0.29 1.09 0.40 0.44 0.40 0.02 0.06 16.6
France 1.17 0.78 0.54 0.54 0.52 0.47 0.38 1.50 13.3
Greece 0.27 0.05
Italy 0.68 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.07 0.05 0.48 6.3
Netherlands 2.03 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.60 65.9
Peru 0.07
Spain 0.69 0.31 0.24 0.31 0.31
Uruguay 0.16 0.01 0.71 15.6
Scandinavian civil law 0.69 0.26 0.26 0.51 0.51 0.04 0.06 1.67 35.9
Denmark 0.67 0.36 0.36 0.86 0.76 0.03 0.03 2.23 38.2
Norway 0.70 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.26 0.06 0.10 1.12 33.5
Sweden 1.77 0.47 0.47 0.47 20.6
Full Sample 1.06 0.58 0.48 0.46 0.37 0.18 0.17 0.92 29.0
Stock of bonds to GDP Co.'s per 
million 
people Rajan and Zingales
Table 1  Financial Development Indicators, 1900 and 1913
Stock Market Capitalization to GDP
58Table 2 Summary Statistics for Financial Development Data and Controls
Full Sample
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Rajan & Zingales stock mkt data 1913 22 1.51 4.38 0.02 21.00 5 0.53 0.41 16 0.60 0.51
La Porta et al. stock mkt data 1913 22 1.41 4.38 0.02 21.00 5 0.64 0.43 16 0.43 0.23
Stock Market Cap/GDP 1900 21 0.37 0.24 0.03 0.82 5 0.36 0.25 16 0.38 0.24
Stock Market Cap/GDP 1913 24 0.46 0.31 0.02 1.23 6 0.44 0.34 18 0.47 0.31
Change in stock mkt cap 1900-1913 27 1.04 4.99 -0.27 26.00 6 0.11 0.23 20 0.07 0.15
Bond Market Cap / GDP 1900 17 0.18 0.22 0.01 0.81 3 0.36 0.41 14 0.14 0.16
Bond Market Cap / GDP 1913 19 0.17 0.21 0.01 0.86 5 0.27 0.35 14 0.13 0.12
Private credit /GDP 1913 14 0.93 0.56 0.37 2.23 4 0.71 0.35 10 1.02 0.62
Traded companies/million people 1913 23 29.00 25.61 0.82 108.70 6 25.23 24.27 17 30.33 26.65
Average inflation (1880-1913) 26 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.05 6 0.01 0.01 20 0.02 0.02
Growth rate 1870-1900 23 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 5 0.01 0.01 18 0.01 0.00
Growth rate 1870-1913 22 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.06 5 0.03 0.01 17 0.03 0.01
Growth rate 1890-1900 24 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.05 5 0.02 0.01 19 0.02 0.01
Growth rate 1890-1913 24 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.06 5 0.03 0.02 19 0.03 0.01
GDP  per cap in 1870 (1990 mill PPP$) 22 1875 837 533 3915 6 2295 1265 16 1718 591
GDP per cap in  1890 (1990 mill PPP$) 24 2247 1013 575 4708 5 2878 1541 19 2081 803
Common law 26 0.23 0.43 0 1 6 1 0
French civil law 26 0.50 0.51 0 1 20 0.65 0.49
German civil law 26 0.15 0.37 0 1 20 0.20 0.41
Scandinavian civil law 26 0.12 0.33 0 1 20 0.15 0.37
*Note:  All GDP per capita and real GDP growth rates used as controls from Maddison (2003) (1990 PPP/International Geary-Khamis Dollars).
Common Law Sample Civil Law Sample
59Table 3 Simple conditional correlates of financial development and the common law dummy
Panel A: OLS regressions using different estimates of stock market capitalization (1913, 1900) as dependent variables
R&Z mkt cap 
/ GDP 1913
R&Z mkt cap 
/ GDP 1913
R&Z mkt cap 
/ GDP 1913
R&Z mkt cap 
/ GDP 1913
LLS mkt cap 
/GDP 1913
LLS mkt cap 
/GDP 1913
LLS mkt cap 
/GDP 1913


















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Common law dummy -0.076 0.007 -0.065 -0.024 0.211 0.152 0.117 0.123 -0.028 -0.046 -0.133 -0.103 -0.017 -0.077 -0.145 -0.086
[0.215] [0.174] [0.181] [0.179] [0.192] [0.152] [0.154] [0.156] [0.153] [0.145] [0.148] [0.149] [0.122] [0.086] [0.091] [0.085]
Ln(GDP per cap 1890) 0.117 0.05 0.039 0.26 0.228 0.186 0.282 0.22 0.182 0.243 0.16 0.197
[0.173] [0.171] [0.196] [0.108]** [0.112]+ [0.139] [0.098]*** [0.083]** [0.101]+ [0.069]*** [0.049]*** [0.084]**
Years on gold 0.01 0.005 0.009 0.012
[0.007] [0.005] [0.004]+ [0.004]**
Avg. Inflation since 1880 -5.406 -5.148 -7.684 -3.486
[3.625] [3.292] [2.547]*** [3.685]
Constant 0.602 -0.387 -0.105 0.283 0.428 -1.534 -1.397 -0.897 0.469 -1.658 -1.378 -0.776 0.376 -1.452 -0.95 -1.062
[0.131]*** [1.342] [1.223] [1.544] [0.059]*** [0.816]+ [0.803] [1.087] [0.075]*** [0.725]** [0.584]** [0.783] [0.061]*** [0.512]** [0.344]** [0.665]
Observations 21 20 20 20 21 20 20 20 24 22 22 22 21 21 21 21
Adjusted R-squared -0.048 -0.065 0.049 -0.061 0.05 0.271 0.274 0.298 -0.044 0.156 0.276 0.283 -0.052 0.295 0.476 0.291
F-statistic 0.12 0.23 1.73 0.93 1.2 3.26 2.9 3.9 0.03 4.16 5.6 4.88 0.02 6.58 10.88 4.01
F-test p-value 0.73 0.80 0.20 0.45 0.29 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.86 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.89 0.01 0.00 0.02





































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Common law dummy 0.217 0.147 0.13 0.176 0.144 0.171 0.17 0.165 -0.307 -0.495 -0.585 -0.512 -5.094 -10.742 -15.639 -13.517
[0.210] [0.233] [0.246] [0.215] [0.153] [0.183] [0.192] [0.179] [0.260] [0.295] [0.311]+ [0.277]+ [11.518] [10.977] [12.312] [11.967]
Ln(GDP per cap 1890) 0.098 0.087 -0.035 0.052 0.052 -0.024 0.697 0.158 0.261 27.426 23.646 23.001
[0.066] [0.063] [0.100] [0.057] [0.058] [0.071] [0.245]** [0.247] [0.285] [8.262]*** [6.991]*** [7.827]***
Years on gold 0.002 0 0.031 0.597
[0.004] [0.002] [0.010]** [0.294]+
Avg. Inflation since 1880 -6.356 -4.284 -17.588 -334.619
[3.235]+ [1.870]** [7.434]** [215.214]
Constant 0.144 -0.595 -0.535 0.494 0.13 -0.263 -0.261 0.381 1.02 -4.267 -0.906 -0.719 30.326 -176.385 -160.764 -137.131
[0.044]*** [0.466] [0.459] [0.779] [0.033]*** [0.418] [0.428] [0.559] [0.201]*** [1.711]** [1.709] [2.221] [6.563]*** [59.549]*** [52.367]*** [58.413]**
Observations 17 17 17 17 19 18 18 18 14 13 13 13 23 21 21 21
Adjusted R-squared 0.093 0.078 0.019 0.169 0.047 0.075 0.009 0.134 -0.012 0.171 0.427 0.308 -0.039 0.283 0.336 0.291
F-statistic 1.07 1.74 1.06 2.53 0.88 0.91 0.57 2.21 1.39 5.4 4.87 4.47 0.2 5.51 4.15 3.76
F-test p-value 0.32 0.21 0.40 0.10 0.36 0.42 0.65 0.13 0.26 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.66 0.01 0.02 0.03
Ordinary least square regression using as dependent variable different measures of financial development in 1900 and 1913. Controls include log of GDP per capita in 1890 (in 1990 PPP/International Geary-Khamis Dollars), the number of years on the gold standard, 
and average inflation since 1880. Robust standard errors in brackets. Coefficients marked as follows + significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
60Table 4A Stock Market Capitalization to GDP Regressions (OLS) Rajan and Zingales and La Porta et al. Data, 1913

























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ln(GDP per cap 1870) 0.337 0.342 0.336 0.334
[0.118]** [0.269] [0.116]** [0.206]
GDP growth 1870-1913 -6.518 -6.697 -6.545 -6.432
[4.341] [8.718] [4.079] [7.090]
Ln(GDP per cap 1890) 0.215 0.14 0.209 0.17
[0.157] [0.230] [0.155] [0.213]
GDP growth 1890-1913 -11.295 -9.023 -11.367 -10.301
[6.532] [8.702] [6.506]+ [8.548]
Avg. inflation since 1880 0.251 -0.152 -4.317 -2.089
[9.785] [6.060] [7.296] [5.917]
Legal origin dummies
Common law -0.024 -0.024 0.056 0.062
[0.172] [0.182] [0.197] [0.204]
French civil law -0.013 -0.016 0.068 0.132
[0.146] [0.226] [0.135] [0.176]
Civil law Tradition 0.017 0.017 -0.021 -0.008
[0.150] [0.160] [0.193] [0.194]
Constant -1.828 -1.861 -1.843 -1.824 -0.878 -0.339 -0.778 -0.494
[0.863]+ [1.845] [0.843]** [1.426] [1.216] [1.708] [1.263] [1.652]
Observations 17 17 17 17 20 20 20 20
Adjusted R-squared 0.18 0.11 0.24 0.18 0.01 -0.03 0.07 0.01
F-statistic 2.51 2.93 3.21 3.69 1.28 1.8 1.8 2.03
F-test p-value 0.1 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.32 0.18 0.19 0.14
Panel B: Correlates of Stock Market Capitalization in 1913 using data from LLS (2008)
La Porta et al 
1913
La Porta et al 
1913
La Porta et al 
1913
La Porta et al 
1913
La Porta et al 
1913
La Porta et al 
1913
La Porta et al 
1913
La Porta et al 
1913
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Ln(GDP per cap 1870) 0.343 0.279 0.338 0.267
[0.134]** [0.287] [0.132]** [0.222]
GDP growth 1870-1913 -2.528 -0.19 -2.657 0.168
[4.357] [8.241] [4.398] [6.732]
Ln(GDP per cap 1890) 0.3 0.211 0.302 0.224
[0.133]** [0.190] [0.125]** [0.179]
GDP growth 1890-1913 -5.115 -2.439 -5.09 -2.948
[4.728] [5.837] [4.661] [5.488]
Avg. inflation since 1880 -3.279 -3.825 -5.085 -4.198
[10.323] [6.793] [5.871] [4.455]
Legal origin dummies
Common law 0.072 0.084 0.146 0.154
[0.176] [0.178] [0.177] [0.176]
French civil law -0.061 -0.021 -0.024 0.053
[0.142] [0.222] [0.117] [0.161]
Civil law Tradition -0.104 -0.094 -0.158 -0.132
[0.156] [0.165] [0.166] [0.172]
Constant -1.971 -1.54 -1.856 -1.372 -1.691 -1.056 -1.561 -0.989
[1.003]+ [1.998] [0.973]+ [1.556] [0.979] [1.396] [0.890]+ [1.303]
Observations 17 17 17 17 20 20 20 20
Adjusted R-squared 0.21 0.15 0.27 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.27 0.26
F-statistic 2.05 2.12 2.49 2.8 1.71 2.39 2.12 3.12
F-test p-value 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.07 0.2 0.09 0.14 0.05
Ordinary least square regression of a sample of 19 countries of different legal families. The dependent variable is stock market capitalization to 
GDP in 1913 according to Rajan and Zingales (2003) or La Porta et al (2008). Controls include the growth rate of real GDP from 1870/1890 to 1913 
and the natural logarithm of GDP per capita in 1870/1890 (all GDP figures for controls in 1990 PPP/International Geary-Khamis Dollars), average 
inflation from 1880 to 1913, dummies indicating whether the country adheres to the common law or French civil law families, and a dummy for 
countries that follow the civil law tradition (German, French, and Scandinavian civil law countries).Robust standard errors in brackets. 
Coefficients marked as follows + significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
61Table 4B  Stock Market Capitalization to GDP Regressions (OLS), 1900 and 1913

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ln(GDP per cap 1870) 0.256 0.187 0.233 0.139
[0.051]*** [0.096]+ [0.052]*** [0.100]
GDP growth 1870-1900 -4.023 -1.572 -1.394 1.346
[5.862] [8.418] [6.978] [9.363]
Ln(GDP per cap 1890) 0.244 0.229 0.24 0.224
[0.065]*** [0.064]*** [0.064]*** [0.064]***
GDP growth 1890-1900 8.386 7.401 9.77 8.691
[4.086]+ [4.786] [3.647]** [4.292]+
Avg. inflation since 1880 -4.515 -6.639 -1.831 -1.921
[5.314] [5.477] [2.845] [2.779]
Legal origin dummies
Common law -0.188 -0.173 -0.103 -0.107
[0.137] [0.133] [0.128] [0.130]
French civil law -0.162 -0.126 -0.067 -0.065
[0.128] [0.135] [0.112] [0.114]
Civil law 0.105 0.11 0.063 0.068
[0.101] [0.103] [0.088] [0.087]
Constant -1.341 -0.838 -1.389 -0.673 -1.604 -1.451 -1.7 -1.543
[0.369]*** [0.706] [0.380]*** [0.743] [0.450]*** [0.476]*** [0.527]*** [0.543]**
Observations 18 18 18 18 20 20 20 20
Adjusted R-squared 0.185 0.156 0.137 0.162 0.498 0.472 0.515 0.493
F-statistic 7.22 3.97 8.35 5.12 7.15 5.08 10.02 6.72
F-test p-value 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00

















(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Ln(GDP per cap 1870) 0.265 -0.01 0.237 -0.054
[0.107]** [0.137] [0.115]+ [0.140]
GDP growth 1870-1913 0.368 13.469 -0.369 15.072
[5.231] [7.847] [6.444] [7.708]+
Ln(GDP per cap 1890) 0.289 0.167 0.307 0.143
[0.119]** [0.134] [0.116]** [0.120]
GDP growth 1890-1913 -2.881 1.864 -2.838 3.073
[5.446] [5.920] [6.027] [5.367]
Avg. inflation since 1880 -14.674 -16.669 -6.947 -8.693
[5.750]** [5.439]*** [3.928]+ [3.198]**
Legal Origin Dummies
Common law -0.257 -0.217 -0.173 -0.165
[0.209] [0.164] [0.188] [0.175]
French civil law -0.307 -0.102 -0.226 -0.114
[0.181] [0.194] [0.140] [0.170]
Civil law 0.073 0.167 0.043 0.114
[0.170] [0.121] [0.160] [0.140]
Constant -1.282 0.486 -1.307 0.571 -1.501 -0.65 -1.814 -0.652
[0.766] [0.934] [0.822] [0.958] [0.837]+ [0.949] [0.792]** [0.871]
Observations 19 19 19 19 22 22 22 22
Adjusted R-squared 0.073 0.252 -0.047 0.289 0.186 0.229 0.12 0.252
F-statistic 3.63 2.88 1.64 3.85 2.29 2.57 2.81 3.26
F-test p-value 0.03 0.06 0.22 0.03 0.1 0.07 0.07 0.04
Ordinary least square regression of a sample of 21 countries of different legal families. The dependent variable is stock market capitalization to 
GDP in 1913 and 1900. Controls include the growth rate of real GDP from 1870 to 1900/1913 or 1890 to 1900/1913 and the natural logarithm of 
GDP per capita in 1870 or 1890 (all GDP figures for controls in 1990 PPP/International Geary-Khamis Dollars), average inflation from 1880 to 
1900/1913, dummies indicating whether the country adheres to the common law or French civil law families, and a dummy for countries that 
follow the civil law tradition (German, French, and Scandinavian civil law countries).Robust standard errors in brackets. Coefficients marked as 
follows + significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
62Table 5 Bond Market Capitalization to GDP Regressions (OLS), 1900 and 1913

























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ln(GDP per cap 1870) -0.029 -0.15 -0.023 -0.079
[0.108] [0.175] [0.106] [0.169]
GDP growth 1870-1900 -25.459 -18.588 -25.103 -21.412
[12.221]+ [14.888] [12.460]+ [13.411]
Ln(GDP per cap 1890) 0.119 -0.099 0.116 -0.07
[0.099] [0.189] [0.096] [0.170]
GDP growth 1890-1900 -1.84 3.511 -1.93 1.961
[4.922] [6.131] [4.582] [5.457]
Avg. inflation since 1880 -5.092 -2.545 -9.024 -7.158
[5.480] [4.611] [5.437] [4.622]
Legal origin dummies
Common law 0.284 0.354 0.141 0.26
[0.163] [0.161]+ [0.244] [0.272]
French civil law 0.041 0.1 0.019 0.111
[0.088] [0.086] [0.087] [0.119]
Civil law -0.256 -0.272 -0.133 -0.194
[0.159] [0.167] [0.232] [0.225]
Constant 0.656 1.486 0.883 1.292 -0.721 0.87 -0.551 0.916
[0.857] [1.307] [0.903] [1.343] [0.639] [1.307] [0.688] [1.329]
Observations 16 16 16 16 17 17 17 17
Adjusted R-squared 0.29 0.27 0.34 0.30 -0.06 0.09 0.02 0.11
F-Test 1.48 1.49 1.67 1.04 1.1 1.68 1.52 1.73
Prob>F 0.27 0.28 0.23 0.43 0.4 0.22 0.26 0.21

























(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Ln(GDP per cap 1870) 0.055 0.039 0.066 0.084
[0.084] [0.156] [0.088] [0.130]
GDP growth 1870-1913 -10.281 -9.482 -9.772 -10.864
[5.118]+ [7.757] [5.397]+ [7.151]
Ln(GDP per cap 1890) 0.122 0.062 0.107 0.079
[0.084] [0.152] [0.080] [0.143]
GDP growth 1890-1913 -7.95 -5.795 -7.872 -6.975
[4.001]+ [6.520] [4.038]+ [5.990]
Avg. inflation since 1880 -0.897 1.126 -2.983 -1.218
[4.535] [3.049] [4.480] [3.628]
Legal origin dummies
Common law 0.283 0.284 0.224 0.233
[0.150]+ [0.154]+ [0.172] [0.169]
French civil law 0.093 0.106 0.074 0.114
[0.057] [0.102] [0.044] [0.075]
Civil law -0.222 -0.231 -0.191 -0.187
[0.148] [0.166] [0.163] [0.176]
Constant -0.043 0.058 0.134 0.024 -0.624 -0.203 -0.276 -0.073
[0.604] [1.041] [0.640] [0.854] [0.599] [1.050] [0.529] [0.921]
Observations 17 17 17 17 18 18 18 18
Adjusted R-squared 0.31 0.25 0.32 0.27 0.24 0.21 0.26 0.21
F-Test 1.83 2.02 1.27 1.35 1.76 2.27 1.52 1.61
Prob>F 0.19 0.15 0.33 0.31 0.2 0.11 0.25 0.23
Ordinary least square regression of a sample of 15 to 17 countries of different legal families. The dependent variable is the face 
value of all corporate bonds to GDP in 1900 or 1913. Controls include the growth rate of real GDP from 1870 to 1900  and 1913 or  
1890 to 1913 and the natural logarithm of the 1870 and 1890 GDP (all GDP figures for controls in 1990 PPP/International Geary-
Khamis Dollars), average inflation from 1880 to 1900 or 1913, dummies indicating whether the country adheres to the common law 
or French civil law families, and a dummy for countries that follow the civil law tradition (German, French, and Scandinavian civil 
law countries).Robust standard errors in brackets. Coefficients marked as follows + significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%.





















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ln(GDP per cap 1870) 0.862 0.462 34.228 33.707
[0.353]** [0.378] [9.189]*** [13.469]**
GDP growth 1870-1900 -5.884 4.188 -607.735 -580.418
[9.948] [11.022] [396.357] [529.636]
Ln(GDP per cap 1890) 0.693 0.257 35.868 35.447
[0.279]** [0.448] [8.426]*** [9.701]***
GDP growth 1890-1900 -12.811 0.231 -993.031 -978.414
[8.963] [15.533] [370.235]** [409.973]**
Avg. inflation since 1880 -15.802 -17.733 -29.592 -22.379
[11.456] [16.486] [398.163] [260.613]
Legal origin dummies
Common law -0.631 -0.659 -0.405 -0.514 -14.037 -14.199 -10.314 -10.506
[0.377] [0.353]+ [0.308] [0.349] [9.779] [10.266] [8.445] [8.871]
Constant -5.093 -2.235 -3.874 -0.696 -202.929 -199.397 -214.429 -211.244
[2.509]+ [2.729] [1.990]+ [3.285] [59.180]*** [90.740]** [52.817]*** [63.931]***
Observations 13 13 13 13 19 19 21 21
Adjusted R-squared 0.27 0.286 0.183 0.221 0.314 0.265 0.456 0.422
F-statistic 2.84 2.91 3.3 4.76 4.76 3.85 6.76 4.74
F-test p-value 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.01
Ordinary least square regression of a sample of 13 countries of different legal families. The dependent variable is private credit (stock of bonds + 
the stock of private loans) to GDP in 1913 or the number of traded companies per million people in 1913. Controls include the growth rate of real 
GDP from 1870/1890 to 1913 and the natural logarithm of GDP per capita in 1870/1890 (all GDP figures for controls in 1990 PPP/International 
Geary-Khamis Dollars), average inflation from 1880 to 1913, and dummies indicating whether the country adheres to the common law. Robust 
standard errors in brackets. Coefficients marked as follows + significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
64Table 7 Deposits per capita, 1913, 1925, 1929
Panel A: Summary statistics, deposits per capita
Obs
a Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Full Sample
Deposits per capita 1913 28 56.3 64.8 0.2 234.9
Deposits per capita 1925 41 74.9 94.9 0.0 370.4
Deposits per capita 1929 38 92.2 110.4 1.3 454.6
Change in deposits 1913-1929 26 57.3 59.1 -0.5 219.7
Common law
Deposits per capita 1913 7 108.4 71.9 0.2 206.9
Deposits per capita 1925 8 185.7 118.8 1.2 370.4
Deposits per capita 1929 7 223.8 106.3 58.8 389.6
Change in deposits 1913-1929 6 110.0 54.0 31.7 182.7
German civil law
Deposits per capita 1913 3 87.8 127.4 11.5 234.9
Deposits per capita 1925 11 53.0 86.5 0.0 299.3
Deposits per capita 1929 10 80.6 133.7 4.9 454.6
Change in deposits 1913-1929 3 107.1 97.6 47.4 219.7
French civil law
Deposits per capita 1913 14 19.8 24.0 0.9 75.1
Deposits per capita 1925 18 27.4 35.4 1.3 133.1
Deposits per capita 1929 17 33.5 38.2 1.3 138.7
Change in deposits 1913-1929 13 17.1 18.1 -0.5 63.6
Scandinavian civil law
Deposits per capita 1913 4 69.2 19.4 42.1 84.3
Deposits per capita 1925 4 127.4 59.0 52.4 185.5
Deposits per capita 1929 4 140.8 54.0 67.3 184.3
Change in deposits 1913-1929 4 71.6 34.8 25.1 102.3
Panel B: Means test, t-statistics
1913 1925 1929
Common vs. all civil law -2.71** -4.46*** -4.20***
Common vs. French civil law -4.25*** -5.26*** -6.58***
Common vs. German civil law -0.33 -2.82** -2.35**
Common vs. Scandinavian civil law -1.05 -0.91 -1.43
#
French vs. common and civil law 3.56*** 3.13*** 3.32***
German  vs. common and civil law -0.88 0.89 0.38
# significant at 20%; + significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Deposits per capita
a Sample size differs from that used for regressions because there is no GDP data for all the 
countries in the sample
65Table 8 Deposits per capita regressions, 1913, 1925, 1929




























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (10)
Ln(GDP per cap 1890) 57.9 60.5 56.5
[16.2]*** [13.7]*** [14.7]***
GDP growth since 1890 922.2 1227.5 921.6
[443.7]+ [659.8]+ [361.5]**
Ln(GDP per cap 1913) 92.4 99.5 84.6 103.80 106.00 88.50
[24.6]*** [28.7]*** [25.1]*** [43.1]** [59.0]+ [38.0]**
GDP growth since 1913 220.8 47.7 206.3 366.10 91.60 373.40
[298.2] [213.5] [340.0] [376.3] [247.7] [466.4]
Avg. inflation since 1880 (541) -557.9 -618
[624.6] [258.6]** [405.2]
Common law 56.9 61.3 117.5 101.3 126.40 113.40
[19.9]*** [20.2]*** [32.7]*** [50.4]+ [48.1]** [88.5]
French civil law -76.9 -134.4 -159.4
[15.5]*** [34.1]*** [41.5]***
German civil law -17.6 -119.6 -116.5
[62.4] [47.4]** [68.2]+
Scandinavian c.l. -33.3 -67.4 -82.8
[15.0]** [34.6]+ [37.7]**
Constant -416.3 -433.1 -347.8 -627.4 -644.6 -449.4 -704.9 -677.3 -457.1
[106.9]*** [88.2]*** [110.7]*** [175.3]*** [199.1]*** [199.4]** [309.7]** [405.5] [306.8]
Observations 24.00 20.00 24.00 33.00 21.00 33.00 32.00 19.00 32.00
Adjusted R-squared 0.48 0.47 0.56 0.58 0.51 0.60 0.49 0.36 0.51
F-Test 18.48 18.00 10.59 17.68 7.04 13.07 16.87 6.10 19.09
Prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00













(1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP growth 1913-1929 -253.1 160.6 -528.4 -265.1
[359.7] [370.0] [467.3] [386.8]
Avg. inflation 1913-1929 -127.3 -186.3
[132.8] [163.5]
Common law 76.5 67.2
[25.1]*** [31.3]**
French civil law -108.3 -93.3
[21.7]*** [27.8]***
German civil law -19.9 4
[55.1] [69.5]
Scandinavian c.l. -55.2 -51.8
[26.2]** [29.3]+
Constant 54.5 122.2 73.2 136.4
[19.9]** [18.2]*** [32.7]** [20.4]***
Observations 23 23 23 23
Adjusted R-squared 0.25 0.49 0.24 0.51
F-Test 8.44 9.02 7.71 7.35
Prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ordinary least square regression of a sample of 24 to 33 countries of different legal families. The dependent variable is 
deposits per capita in 1913, 1925, and 1929. Robust standard errors in brackets. Coefficients marked as follows + significant 
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.









































































































































Creditor Rights in 1910 Creditor Rights in 1910
No automatic stay on assets 1011010111111 0 . 6 1 . 0
Secured creditors have first priority 1111111111110 1 . 0 0 . 8
Creditors approve reorganization 1111101111111 0 . 9 1 . 0
Management does not stay during reorganization 1011010000001 0 . 6 0 . 2
Creditor Rights Index  1910 4 2 4 4 232333333 3 . 0 3 . 0 g
Creditor Rights in 1995
No automatic stay on assets 1100111011000 0 . 7 0 . 4
Secured creditors have first priority 1011111011110 0 . 8 0 . 6
Creditors approve reorganization 1000111000011 0 . 5 0 . 2
Management does not stay during reorganization 1000111000000 0 . 5 0 . 0
Creditor Rights Index 1995 4111444022121 2 . 7 1 . 3
Sources: All creditor rights for 1995 from La Porta et al., “Law and Finance,” Table 4. Creditor rights for 1910 from the country sections of Oscar 
Borchardt and Josef Kohler (eds.), Die Handelsgesetze des Erdballs : umfassend das Handels-, Wechsel-, Konkurs- und Seerecht aller Kulturvölker, mit 
Ergänzungen und Erläuterungen aus dem Zivilrecht, Prozessrecht und der Gerichtsverfassung und einer Zusammenstellung der handelsrechtlichen 
Nebengesetze in der Landessprache mit gegenüberstehender deutscher Übersetzung ... Berlin : R. v. Decker, [1906-1914], vols. I to XIV. Australia and 
Canada coded as following British bankruptcy law according to Richard Brown, “Comparative Legislation in Bankruptcy.” Journal of the Society of 






























































































































































Proxy voting 00011 1 ? 1 10 1 ?
Shares not blocked before meeting 01000? 0 00 0 ?
Cumulative voting or proportional rep. 000000 0 00 0 ?
Provision for minorities to challenge 
directors' decisions 00000? 0 10 0 1
Shareholders have 1
st right to buy new 
stock 00000? 1 00 1 ?
Capital needed to call an extraordinary 
meeting is less than or equal to 10% 00111? 0 00 0 1
Anti-director rights inde x 011221 2 20 2 2
Sources: England in the 1880s from Campbell and Turner (2007), England in 1908 from Franks, Mayer, and Rossi (2004), Germany 
from Franks, Mayer and Wagner (2006), Japan from Franks, Mayer, and Miyajima (2007), China from Williams (1905), Italy from 
Aganin and Volpin (2006), Brazil from Musacchio (2007), Chile from Islas Rojas (2007), and France, Egypt, and Sweden constructed 
from information in Wellhoff (1917).
Table 10. Shareholder Rights Across countries
Common 
law French civil law  German civil law
68Table 11. Taxation of Securities in Selected Countries (Taxes in Percentage Points), 1905
Panel A Taxes for either registering or listing securities on the stock exchange






Turkey Luxembourg Romania Serbia
Domestic securities
Shares (co. authorized for <10yrs) 0.6 2 0.3125 0.5 0.5 2 0.5 0.15 1 0.32 0.07-4.2 0.2 0.15-1.5 0.04-0.4 3 none 0.15-0.75 1 0.05 0.1 0.4
Shares (co. authorized for >10yrs) 1.2 2 0.625 0.5 1 4 0.5 0.15 1 0.32 0.07-4.2 0.2 0.15-1.5 0.04-0.4 3 none 0.15-0.75 1 0.05 0.1 0.4
Corporate bonds 1.2 6 0.3125 0.5 1 2-4 0.125-0.5 0.125 1 0.32 0.07-4.2 1 0.15-1.5 0.04-0.4 3 none 0.06 0.5 0.05 0.1 0.4
Government bonds exempt exempt exempt exempt exempt exempt exempt exempt 1 0.32 0.07-4.2 exempt exempt exempt exempt none exempt exempt exempt exempt exempt
Foreign securities
Shares (unsubscribed)* 2 2.5 0.625 2-4 0.5 0.66 1 0.32 0.07-4.2 0.3 0.15-1.5 0.04-0.4 3 none 0.15-0.75 1 0.05 0.1 exempt
Shares (subscribed) 0.6 2.5 0.625 2-4 0.5 0.66 1 0.32 0.07-4.2 0.3 0.15-1.5 0.04-0.4 3 none 0.15-0.75 1 0.05 0.1 exempt
Corporate bonds 0.6 1 0.625 2-4 0.5 0.66 1 0.32 0.07-4.2 0.3 0.15-1.5 0.04-0.4 3 none 0.06 1 0.05 0.1 exempt
Government bonds 1 6 0.625 2-4 0.5 0.66 1 0.32 0.07-4.2 0.2 0.15-1.5 0.04-0.4 3 none exempt 1 0.05 0.1 exempt
Panel B Taxes on the turnover of securities






Turkey Luxembourg Romania Serbia
Domestic securities
Nominal Shares/bonds 0.5 0.2 0.65 1 0.5 0 0 0.15-1.5 0 0 3-10 none none none none none
Bearer shares/bonds 0.2 0.2 0.65 1 0.5 0 0 0.15-1.5 0 0 3-10 none none none none none
Government bonds exempt 0.2 exempt 1 exempt 0 0 exempt 0 0 3-10 none none none none none
Foreign securities
Shares (unsubscribed) 0.5
a 0.3 0.65 1 0.5 0 0 0.15-1.5 0 0 3-10 none none none none none
Shares (subscribed) 0.2 0.3 0.65 1 0.5 0 0 0.15-1.5 0 0 3-10 none none none none none
Corporate bonds 1.25 0.3 0.65 1 0.5 0 0 0.15-1.5 0 0 3-10 none none none none none
Government bonds 0.2 1.65 1 0.5 0 0 exempt 0 0 3-10 none none none none none
Panel C Taxes on interests and dividends or by broker transaction






Turkey Luxembourg Romania Serbia
On interests and dividends
Private securities 4 2 2 none 3-5 5.83 1.3-2.5 2 10 10 0.01-1.5 8-12 5 1 2-5 1.5-3.75 5 3 5 6-10
Government and guaranteed bonds 0 10 none 20 5.83 1.3-2.5 2 10 20 0.01-1.5 8-12 5 1 2-5 5 exempt 5 6-10
On stock market transactions (brokers)
Shares and corporate bonds 0.00125 0 0.5-1
b 0.1 0.1 0.1-4
c 0.01 0.22-2.0 none none 3-5 none none 0.2-1 fixed 0.1
Government bonds 0.00125 0 exempt 0.1 0.1 0.1-4
c 0.01 0.22-2.0 none none 3-5 none none 0.2-1 fixed 0.1
Source: "Régime fiscal des valeurs mobilières en Europe" in Bulletin de L'Institut International de Statistique  XIV- 3 (1905): 295-311.
a One 1/10 of the shares had to be traded and 2/10 of the bonds
b Taxes on stock market transactions for shares and bonds in Austria were fixed in kreuzner, at around 50 for most bonds and 20 for most shares. Most of the securities traded in Austria were quoted at around 400-500 Kr, so approximately the tax would be equivalente to something between 0.5 and 1%, obviously
c The stamp tax was 1 drachma, with stock and bond prices ranging from 10 to 250 dr, this tax would be equivalent to 0.001 to 0.05%
d Broad ranges of taxes given for Italy because the taxes were in lira and ranged depending on the "dimension" the paper. The percentage equivalent estimated using a range of securities prices from 100 to 1400 liras.
e All rates as a percent estimated using a range of prices from 60 to 350 rubbles
f Swiss rates estimated by looking at the min and max ranges for Basel, Zurich, and Geneva, thus ignoring other financial centers
69Table 12 OLS Regressions using Taxation on Listing and Interest/Dividend Gains. 
Ordinary least square regression of a sample of between 9 and 11 European countries for which data on taxes is available  The hypothesis tested in 
bond mkt  bond mkt  bond mkt  mkt cap mkt  cap mkt  cap mkt  cap mkt  cap mkt  cap mkt  cap mkt  cap mkt  cap 
Ordinary least square regression of a sample of between 9 and 11 European countries for which data on taxes is available. The hypothesis tested in 
specifications 1 through 6 is that higher taxes on the listing of corproate bonds (txlistbonds) or on interest gains (txintdiv) reduces the stock of bonds 
to GDP in a country. In the same why specifications 4 through 9 test if higher taxes on the listing of company shares (txlisteq) or on dividends 
reduces stock market capitalization to GDP. Robust standard errors in brackets. Coefficients marked as follows + significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%.
bo d t 
1913
bo d t 
1913




















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
lntxlistbond -0.018 0.026 0.015
[0.050] [0.066] [0.073]
lntxlisteq -0.172 -0.081 -0.079
[0 062]** [0 079] [0 082] [0.062]** [0.079] [0.082]
lntxintdiv 0.134 0.252 0.244 -0.174 -0.091 -0.08
[0.249] [0.196] [0.263] [0.091]+ [0.136] [0.155]
lngdpc90 0.483 0.525 0.653 0.664 0.562 0.524 0.691 0.639
[0.453] [0.505] [0.345] [0.336] [0.505] [0.552] [0.463] [0.503]
french 0.08 0.018 -0.079 -0.136 french 0.08 0.018 0.079 0.136
[0.207] [0.182] [0.162] [0.163]
Constant 0.252 -3.517 -3.887 0.086 -5.124 -5.207 0.567 -3.816 -3.483 0.718 -4.728 -4.289
[0.081]** [3.483] [3.886] [0.258] [2.733] [2.664] [0.079]*** [3.881] [4.234] [0.156]*** [3.607] [3.938]
Observatio 999888 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
Adjusted R -0.129 -0.095 -0.285 -0.085 0.305 0.132 0.234 0.263 0.18 0.058 0.287 0.229
FT t 01 4 05 9 04 1 02 9 21 5 19 6 77 9 38 3 30 1 36 4 32 7 38 5 F-Test 0.14 0.59 0.41 0.29 2.15 1.96 7.79 3.83 3.01 3.64 3.27 3.85
Prob>F 0.72 0.58 0.75 0.61 0.21 0.26 0.02 0.07 0.1 0.09 0.1 0.08
70Table 13 Pairwise correlation table of main variables used in the analysis
mkt1913 mkt1900 bon~1900 bon~1913 rzm~1913 lls~1913 avginf gdpcmad18gdpcmad18gold1900 gold1913 yrsgold1900
Mkt. Cap/GDP 1913 1
Mkt. Cap/GDP 1900 0.8700* 1
Bond mkt. Cap/GDP 1 0.2414 0.3407 1
Bond mkt. Cap/GDP 1 0.152 0.213 0.9200* 1
R&Z mkt cap 1913 0.2214 0.4556 0.5556* 0.5476* 1
LLS mkt cap 1913 0.6749* 0.6015* 0.6867* 0.7268* 0.9949* 1
Avg. inf since 1880 -0.5249* -0.4645* -0.4973* -0.4336 -0.2041 -0.5206* 1
GDP per cap 1870 0.2568 0.4186 0.3085 0.4256 0.5348* 0.5794* -0.3824 1
GDP per cap 1890 0.4851* 0.6075* 0.3414 0.2931 0.2509 0.5544* -0.3634 0.8889* 1
Gold dummy 1900 0.3875 0.4912* 0.2227 0.155 0.3327 0.3384 -0.4763* 0.246 0.2872 1
Gold dummy 1913 0.161 0.2683 -0.0326 -0.0418 0.1885 0.1579 -0.0083 0.1247 0.0983 0.5860* 1
Yrs. On gold 1900 0.4879* 0.6077* 0.2847 0.2232 0.0893 0.4718* -0.5173* 0.4642* 0.4788* 0.8507* 0.4985* 1
Yrs. On gold 1913 0.4404* 0.5526* 0.2345 0.1654 0.1544 0.4248 -0.4458* 0.3917 0.4034 0.9040* 0.6694* 0.9689*
* denotes significance at the 5% level
71 
Figure 1 Measures of Financial Development vs. Legal Origin in 1900 and 1913 
Panel A: Stock market cap to GDP by legal family in 
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Panel B: Bond market cap to GDP by legal family in 
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Panel C: Companies traded per million people and 
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72 
Figure 2 Bank Deposits per capita 1913, 1925, and 1929 
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